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EMPLOYMENT OF SINGLE MOTHERS: CHILD CARE COSTS AND THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EITC 
 
This dissertation examines the effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) on labor 
force participation of single mothers by controlling for child care costs.  Based on a 
simple model of utility maximizing households that jointly determine hours worked and 
hours of non-maternal child care demanded, I estimate the change in the labor force 
participation rate of single mothers following the EITC expansions of the 1990s. In order 
to investigate the usage of different modes of childcare services, a multinomial logit 
model has been estimated. The data source for the study is topical module panels of the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) for the years 1992, 1993, 1996 and 
2001. These panels were selected to reflect the time horizon during which the policy 
changes of the 1990s took place. The empirical estimation strategy is designed to deal 
with the problems of both selection bias and simultaneity in choosing hours worked and 
hours of non-maternal child care demanded. Due attention has been paid to the issue of 
identification of the empirical equations to be estimated in this paper. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
While the dramatic rise in the labor force participation of women in the latter half of the 
twentieth century is considered as one of the striking labor market developments in the 
post-World War II era, it is the labor force participation of single mothers that has 
received considerable attention among policy researchers in recent years. It is well 
documented that the growth in female labor force participation in the 1990s was largely 
due to dramatic increases in the employment of single mothers (Blank, 2002; Eissa and 
Liebman, 1996; Ellwood, 2000; Hotz and Scholz, 2001; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001;). 
Between 1993 and 1999, the employment of single mothers with children increased by 
more than 12 percentage points, even though never married women (without any  
children) showed little or no change in their participation rates during the same period 
(based on my estimates from the SIPP - Survey of Income and Program Participation – 
panels) .  
Figure 1.1 Labor Force Participation Rate For Single Mothers And Never Married 
Women (Ages 18-60) 
 
Source: Author’s own tabulations from Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 
panels. 
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Figure 1.1 presents labor force participation rates among single mothers and never 
married women from SIPP panels’ of 1992 to 2001, which refers to the time period 1993 
to 2002. Never married women without any children have a high and almost unchanged 
participation rate during this period. In sharp contrast, single mothers’ (with children 
under 18) labor force participation rate dramatically increased between 1993 and 1999 
(SIPP panels 1993 (wave 6) to 1996 (wave 10)). 
A large number of studies have investigated this phenomenal growth in the employment 
of single mothers. The 1990s was an eventful period of time when a number of policy 
changes took place. It was the time when the welfare reform, tax reform, EITC 
expansions, Child Care tax credit, etc. were introduced. This time period was also 
characterized by unusually high and long period of economic growth. Possibly all these 
factors influenced the observed changes in participation of single mothers. There is a 
growing consensus from these studies that the policy changes of the 1990s, in particular 
the 1996 policy reforms of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PROWRA) and expansions in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
have largely contributed to the dramatic rise in the employment of single mothers. The 
results from these studies strongly suggest that the EITC expansions of the 1990s can 
explain a significant part of the changes in the employment of single mothers (Eissa and 
Liebman, 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001; Ellwood, 2000; Hotz and Scholz, 2001). 
It is also well-established that labor force participation of women is influenced by the 
presence of child care costs. A number of studies done in the 1990s consistently estimate 
a negative relationship between child care costs and mothers’ employment (Blau and 
Robbins, 1991; Ribar, 1992; Connelly and Kimmel, 2003). As these single women move 
into the workforce, they face additional costs in the form of child care expenditures. 
Since these women are the sole or primary care-givers for their children, the cost of and 
access to child care is a significant issue in their decision to join the labor force.  
Concerns over childcare issues led to several federal programs in the 1990s. For example, 
the federal government created the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) and 
substantially increased expenditures on child care subsidies during the 1990s. Federal 
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legislative changes allowed the States to use a certain portion of their Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) budget for child care and also expanded the Child 
Care Tax Credit for low-income families. 
This study builds upon and connects these two growing strands of research by examining 
labor supply effects of the EITC expansions of the 1990s in the presence of child care 
costs. Even though a large volume of empirical work has been done to investigate and 
estimate the impact of tax policy changes and child care subsidies on employment of 
single mothers, none has looked at the joint effect of EITC expansions of the 1990s and 
child care costs on labor force participation of single mothers. It is quite likely that the 
EITC-induced labor force participation differs significantly due to child care expenditure.  
Difference-in-Difference method is used to examine the changes in labor supply of single 
mothers (the ‘treatment’ group) compared to never-married women without any children 
(the ‘control’ group). By allowing variations in the cost of childcare to interact with the 
treatment group and post-EITC expansion era, the impact of child care costs on the 
efficacy of the EITC program can be identified. The dataset for the study is derived from 
four panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP): 1992, 1993, 1996 
and 2001 designed to capture the period of policy changes of the 1990s particularly the 
EITC expansions.  
I find that while higher child care cost has negative effect on labor force participation, the 
effectiveness of the EITC expansions has been more pronounced for those single mothers 
whose face relatively high child care costs. My findings suggest that while EITC 
expansions increased participation of single mothers as a group, the increase was 
particularly large for those single mothers who faced higher child care costs. My 
estimates from the Bivariate Probit model suggest that the labor for participation of the 
single mothers increased by 3.32% due to the post-EITC expansions of the 1990s, after 
accounting for child care costs. 
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To investigate how working mothers choose between various modes of child care, I 
estimate a multinomial logit model using predicted child care expenses for the various 
modes as well as a set of socio-economic characteristics. This analysis was performed 
separately for young and older children. The marginal effects were estimated for formal 
care. I find that women with some college or college degree are more likely to use formal 
care compared with relative care. Non-naturalized mothers are less likely to rely on 
formal day care than native citizens. While presence of young children reduces the 
likelihood of using formal care, higher non-labor income increases the chances of relying 
more on formal day care. However, the estimated effects of the (predicted) price 
variables for the various modes of choice are found to be problematic. Though some of 
these are estimated to be significant, many of them have incorrect signs. Nevertheless, 
similar findings have been reported in other studies using SIPP, though in a smaller 
sample (Connolly and Kimmel, 2003). 
It is likely that the demand for child care would increase due to EITC expansions as more 
single mothers seek to get employment. Assuming less than proportionate increase in the 
supply of child care facilities, this is going to raise the price of child care for all users. 
Therefore, it would be interesting to examine the effect of higher labor force participation 
on child care expenses. My estimates suggest that cost of child care is weakly positively 
related with labor force participation, meaning child care costs is likely to increase when 
the rise in participation is taken into consideration. 
As mentioned earlier, there are a number of studies that examined either the effectiveness 
of EITC expansions or the impact of child care costs on labor supply. The main 
contribution of my work is to allow predicted child care expenses to interact with the 
EITC expansion era and my treatment group of single mothers and thus estimate child 
care cost-adjusted effectiveness of EITC expansion. A recent study by Herbst (2010) 
estimates the employment effects of single mothers by controlling for child care subsidies 
and EITC. Findings from this study suggest that while child care subsidies generated the 
largest labor supply response for the single mothers facing high child care costs, the 
efficacy of the EITC benefits was the largest for single mothers with lower wages.   
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There are a number of differences between the current study and this paper by Herbst. 
First, unlike the current study, Herbst does not examine interactions between the EITC 
era and child care costs. Secondly, his work also differs in terms of the data sources. 
Herbst uses various panels of the SIPP to predict child care costs and applies the 
parameter estimates from these child care cost equations to a sample of single mothers 
drawn from the Current Population Survey (CPS). This process of temporal matching of 
the SIPP and CPS surveys has drawbacks in terms of econometric considerations. Works 
by Bollinger and Hirsch (2006) suggest that imputations often lead to biased estimates. 
My study is similar to recent research on labor supply effects of child care costs by 
Connelly and Kimmel (2003) and Ribar (1992). However, my study uses more recent 
panels of the SIPP than these studies and also estimates the heterogeneous effects of the 
EITC across the distribution of child care expenditures. 
This paper also contributes to the recent literature on the EITC and local costs. Even 
though there has been extensive work done to quantify the effects of the EITC on labor 
supply, only few studies have attempted to adjust the impact of EITC by cost-of-living in 
various local areas. The paper by Fitzpatrick and Thompson (2009) investigates how the 
EITC expansions affect the labor supply response of single mothers due to differences in 
the cost-of-living in various geographical areas. The authors include housing costs of 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) to analyze the differential effects of the EITC 
program across geographical areas. Their findings show positive effects of EITC changes 
on labor force participation of single mothers in the lowest cost areas, but no significant 
impact in the highest cost areas. As a result, the authors are skeptic about the 
effectiveness of EITC in addressing unemployment problems in large cities where the 
cost-of-living is high. Since EITC is administered for the low-income working families, 
other costs such as transportation and child care costs are likely to affect the effectiveness 
of the EITC as well. My findings, however, suggest that single mothers living in cities 
with very high child care costs were more responsive to the expansions of the EITC. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. An overview of the EITC program and a 
review of the empirical research literature on the behavioral effects of EITC are discussed 
in the following two sections. The closing section of the first chapter discusses the 
theoretical framework, empirical estimation, and identification issues. The description of 
data with summary statistics on demographics, child care expenses, and EITC credits are 
provided in chapter two. The third chapter deals with the first-stage reduced-form 
estimation of labor force participation and use of paid child care as well as selection-
corrected wage and child care expenditure. The multinomial logit estimation of the 
various modes of child care is also discussed in this chapter. The final-stage estimates of 
labor force participation is presented and discussed in chapter four. The final chapter is a 
concluding section discussing some of the limitations of this study and future areas of 
work.  
 
1.1 Overview of the EITC Program  
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a federal benefit program which began in 1975 
and has been expanded several times since then. Currently it is considered as one of the 
largest anti-poverty programs of the federal government. It has been designed to offset 
federal income taxes and Social Security payroll taxes, supplement earnings, and 
encourage and reward work. The benefit structure of the EITC also reflects the reality 
that larger families face higher living expenses than smaller families. The credit phases in 
as a family’s income rises (at a rate higher for larger families), hits a maximum limit as a 
family’s earnings approach the poverty line, and then phases out at a gradual rate as a 
family’s earnings continues to rise. 
According to the design of the EITC, working families with incomes below the federal 
poverty line receive the largest benefits. Since the credit phases out gradually as income 
rises, many families with incomes above the poverty line also benefit. Families with three 
or more children receive larger credits than one- or two-child families, and married 
couples get more than single parents. For many recipients, especially families just 
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entering the workforce and those with very low earnings, the EITC more than offsets 
taxes paid and thus act as a wage supplement. For example, a single mother with one 
child working full-time at the minimum wage of $7.25 per hour earns $15,080 annually. 
She does not owe any federal income tax, but qualifies for a 2010 EITC of $3,050.  Her 
tax liability is $1,154 (for payroll taxes), so the EITC refund completely offsets these 
taxes and provides an additional $1,896 as a wage supplement. 
Table 1.1 summarizes major developments in the history of the EITC. It was first 
introduced in 1975 as a ‘work bonus’ for families with children on a temporary basis. It 
was made permanent in 1978. There was little change in the credit till the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 (TRA86).  As part of this tax reform package, the maximum credit of the 
EITC was increased to match up to the level of credit in 1975 as the value of the credit 
eroded due to lack of indexing.  It was also indexed for inflation during this tax reform. 
The largest expansions of the EITC took place during the 1990 and 1993 tax reform bills. 
Table 1.1 Timeline of EITC 
1975 
Tax Reduction Act 
Introduced EITC to the Internal Revenue Code, primarily to offset the 
Social Security Taxes of low-income working tax-payers with children 
1978 
Revenue Act 
Made EITC a permanent part of the Internal Revenue Code. 
1984 
The Deficit Reduction Act 
Increased the maximum credit amount and renumbered it to its current 
location in Internal Revenue Code. 
1986 
Tax Reform Act 
Expanded the credit. 
1987 Indexed for Inflation 
1990 
The Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act (OBRA) 
Expanded the supplemental credit amount for families with two or 
more children. 
1993 
The Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act (OBRA) 
Expanded the credit further and added a small supplemental credit 
amount for childless workers. 
1997 
The Taxpayer Relief Act 
Added provisions to improve compliance issues. 
2001 
Economic Growth and Tax 
Relief and Reconciliation Act 
Made changes to add marriage penalty relief and to simplify. 
2009 
The American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) 
Created a new category for families with 3 or more children and 
expanded the maximum credit for this group and for married couples 
filing jointly. 
Source: Compiled from various sources (the Tax Policy Center, the Brookings Institution, and 
Hotz and Scholz, 2001). 
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The current EITC structure follows eight different schedules for workers based on their 
marital status and number of children –single/married worker with no qualifying children, 
those with one child, those with two children, and those with three or more children. Each 
schedule has three ranges: 
 - Phase-in (or subsidy) Range 
 - Stationary Range 
 - Phase-out Range 
 
The 2010 Federal EITC structure is presented in Figure 1.2 (Source: 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/key-elements/family/eitc.cfm). The 
upward-sloping segment of the schedule is the phase-in range where the EITC increases 
with additional earnings. In the plateau or the stationary range, the EITC itself provides 
no additional compensation as income rises. The phase-out range is the downward-
sloping segment of the schedule where the amount of credit falls with each additional 
dollar earned. The phase-out rate is slower than the phase-in rate, which is reflected in the 
flatter slope of the phase-out range. 
Based on the 2010 schedule, a single parent with 3 or more qualifying children is entitled 
to claim a maximum credit of $5,666. The credit is computed as 45% of the first $12,590 
of earned income. This subsidy offsets federal income tax obligations (including taxes 
that fund the Social Security and Medicaid programs) and surplus credits are refunded for 
workers whose EITC subsidy is greater than their tax obligations. The credit amount 
remains constant at this maximum level for income range $12,590-$16,450. Beyond this 
income level of $16,450, it is the phase-out range where the maximum credit is reduced 
at a rate of 21.06% of additional earned income. The subsidy is completely phased out at 
$43,998 of income. 
A single parent with 2 children is entitled to a phase-in credit rate of 40%, which is lower 
than the rate for a single parent with 3 or more children, leading to a lower maximum 
credit. However, the stationary plateau range is the same for these two groups of parents. 
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Their phase-out rate is also same at 21.06%, but the subsidy is entirely phased out earlier 
at an income level of $40,964. 
Figure 1.2 2010 Earned Income Tax Credit by Filing Status and Number of 
Children 
 
Source: http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/key-elements/family/eitc.cfm 
 
Similarly, a single parent with one child can receive a maximum credit of up to $3,050, 
which is computed as 34% of the first $8,950 of earned income. The stationary range 
extends from $8,950 to $16,420. The phase-out credit rate is 15.98% and is completely 
phased out at an income level of $35,463. 
A single worker with no qualifying child is also entitled to a small maximum credit of 
$457, which is 7.65% of the first $5,970 of income. The stationary range is shorter than 
those with children ($5,970-$7,160). The phase-out rate is also lower (7.16%). The 
maximum credit is completely phased out at $13,440 of income. 
Figure 2: 2010 Earned Income Tax Credit  
by Filing Status and Number of Children 
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For married couples filing jointly, the maximum credit is the same as the single parents 
for a given number of children. However, the beginning and ending points of the phase-
out range are $5,010 higher than those of the single, head of household or qualifying 
widow(er). This means the plateaus extend by $5,010 for married couples in each one of 
the four schedules for no children, one child, two children, and three or more children. 
In brief, the EITC structure provides lower phase-in and phase-out credit rates as well as 
lower maximum credits for families with fewer numbers of children. However, the phase-
out range begins at the same income level for families with one/ two/three or more 
children for a given marital status. The maximum credit is completely exhausted at earlier 
income levels for families with fewer children. While married couples enjoy the same 
maximum credit as the single families, their stationary range extends further than the 
single parents. 
The current schedule of the EITC went through a number of large expansions during 
1984-1994. The expansions of the 1990 tax bill were phased in over three years. The 
EITC parameters are shown in Table 1.2. For the first time, the taxpayers with two or 
more children were entitled to a higher credit rate than those with one child in 1991, 
though the increment was small until 1993. The requirements for qualifying children 
were also changed in a way in 1991 that encouraged participation in the EITC. The 
budget bill of 1993 raised the EITC benefits again and particularly for families with two 
or more children.  
A small amount of credit was made available in 1994 for families without any children. 
Since 1994, the difference in credit for families with two or more children began to rise 
sharply; it rose to $2,528 in 1994 from $1,511 in 1993 (in nominal dollars) and further 
increased to $3,556 in 1996. The 1993 tax bills also significantly increased work 
incentives for very low income women as both the credit rate and the maximum credit 
experienced large increases. Another round of expansions took place in 2009 and a new 
category for families with three or more children was introduced. 
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A number of states have also enacted state-level EITC as a fraction of the federal EITC – 
though small in size – through the State income tax codes. In 1994 seven states had their 
own EITCs. In 2010, 23 states and the District of Columbia were administering their own 
state-EITC programs. Since all of the state EITCs were set as a fraction of the Federal 
EITC, these also increased when the Federal rates were expanded (not shown in Table 
1.2). 
Table 1.2 EITC Parameters, 1975-1999 (in nominal dollars) 
Year 
Phase-in Rate 
(%) 
Phase-in Range Maximum Credit 
Phase-out 
Rate (%) 
Phase-out Range 
1975-78 10 $0-$4,000 $400 10 $4,000 - $8,000 
1979-84 10 0-5,000 500 12.5 6,000 - 10,000 
1985-86 11 0-5,000 550 12.22 6,500 - 11,000 
1987 14 0-6,080 851 10 6,920 - 15,432 
1988 14 0-6,240 874 10 9,840 - 18,576 
1989 14 0-6,500 910 10 10,240 - 19,340 
1990 14 0-6,810 953 10 10,730 - 20,264 
1991
a 
16.7
1 0-7,140 1,192 11.93 11,250 - 21,250 
 
17.3
2 
 
1,235 12.36 11,250 - 21,250 
1992
a 
17.6
1 0-7,520 1,324 12.57 11,840 - 22,370 
 
18.4
2 
 
1,384 13.14 11,840 - 22,370 
1993
a 
18.5
1 0-7,750 1,434 13.21 12,200 - 23,050 
 
19.5
2 
 
1,511 13.93 12,200 - 23,050 
1994 23.6
1 0-7,750 2,038 15.98 11,000 - 23,755 
 
30
2 0-8,245 2,528 17.68 11,000 - 25,296 
 
7.65
3 0-4,000 306 7.65 5,000 - 9,000 
1995 34
1 0-6,160 2,094 15.98 11,290 - 24,396 
 
36
2 0-8,640 3,110 20.22 11,290 - 26,673 
 
7.65
3 0-4,100 314 7.65 5,130 - 9,230 
1996 34
1 0-6,330 2,152 15.98 11,610 - 25,078 
 
40
2 0-8,890 3,556 21.06 11,610 - 28,495 
 
7.65
3 0-4,220 323 7.65 5,280 - 9,500 
1997 341 0-6,500 2,210 15.98 11,930 - 25,750 
 
402 0-9,140 3,656 21.06 11,930 - 29,290 
 
7.653 0-4,340 332 7.65 5,430 - 9,770 
1998 341 0-6,680 2,271 15.98 12,260 - 26,473 
 
402 0-9,390 3,756 21.06 12,260 - 30,095 
 
7.653 0-4,460 341 7.65 5,570 - 10,030 
1999 341 0-6,800 2,312 15.98 12,460 - 26,928 
 
402 0-9,540 3,816 21.06 12,460 - 30,580 
 
7.653 0-4,530 347 7.65 5,670 - 10,200 
Source: 1998 Green Book, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 
page 867. 1998 and 1999 parameters come from Publication 596, Internal Revenue Service 
a
Basic credit only. Does not include supplemental young child or health insurance credits. 
1
Taxpayers with one qualifying child. 
2
Taxpayers with more than one qualifying child. 
3
Childless taxpayers.  
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As noted above, one of the policy goals of the EITC program is to encourage and reward 
work. Since the credit acts as a wage supplement, there are important economic 
implications, particularly for labor force participation. The theoretical effects of the EITC 
on labor force participation can be traced out by looking at a model of labor supply based 
on indifference curve analysis. A representative household is assumed to be maximizing 
utility over a market good (C) and non-market time, leisure (L) subject to a budget 
constraint. Household preference is represented by strictly concave utility function, U = 
U(C, L). It is assumed that utility is increasing in C and L )0,0(  LC UU . Since the 
maximum available time is T, the time constraint must satisfy that hours spent for the 
consumption (C) and leisure (L) must equal total time (T): 
(1) T = C + L 
The budget constraint of a representative individual maximizing utility from leisure and 
consumption is illustrated in the Figure 1.3 below.  The budget constraint for a typical 
worker (assuming zero non-labor income) without the EITC benefit is shown by the line 
OD.  The introduction of the EITC alters the budget line from a linear OD to a non-linear 
OABCD, where DC is the phase-in range, CB is the stationary range, and BA is the 
phase-out range. Since the maximum credit is completely phased out beyond A, it 
follows the original budget line after the phase-out range. It is assumed that initially the 
individual is located at point D, supplying zero hours of labor; the reservation wage (the 
slope of the indifference curve (not shown in the diagram) at point D) exceeds the wage 
rate (the slope of the OD income budget line). Because of EITC, the new income budget 
line rotates upwards from OD to OABCD as the wage rate is being supplemented with a 
subsidy in the phase-in range. Given this new higher wage rate and new higher income 
budget line, the individual can reach a higher indifference curve U1; the optimal position 
is now where the indifference curve U1 is tangent with the new budget line OABCD. The 
individual now participates in the labor force and supplies positive hours of work. As a 
result, the labor force participation rate is predicted to increase for people who were not 
in the labor force when the wage rate rises due to expansions in the EITC phase-in credit 
rates. 
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According to standard labor market theory in economics, EITC, therefore, 
unambiguously makes joining the labor force (extensive margin) more attractive in the 
phase-in range because it increases the market wage by the phase-in credit rate. However, 
the effect of EITC on hours of work for those already in the labor force (intensive 
margin) is ambiguous due to offsetting impacts of substitution and income effects in the 
phase-in range and depends on their initial position (before the expansion) on the budget 
line. 
Figure 1.3 : Effect of the EITC on Household Budget Constraint 
 
When the wage increases, the income effect makes workers feel wealthier and therefore 
makes them want more of both leisure and consumption. The substitution effect, 
however, makes leisure relatively expensive (since the worker would have to give up 
higher wages to have free time or leisure); so workers will want more consumption and 
less leisure. Because labor is inversely related to leisure, this means that an increase in 
wages will cause labor to both increase (due to substitution effect) and decrease (due to 
income effect). Therefore, when wages increase, the combined effect of the substitution 
and income effect on the level of labor and leisure is uncertain for those already in the 
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labor force and operating in the phase-in range. If we assume that the substitution effect 
is stronger, then workers will choose to work more in the phase-in range. In contrast, 
economic theory predicts that the effect of EITC would be to decrease labor supply 
(intensive margin) for families in the stationary range due to negative income effect (and 
no offsetting substitution effect). Economic theory also predicts that EITC would reduce 
labor supply for earners in the phase-out range because of reinforcing negative 
substitution effects and negative income effects. Therefore, EITC is clearly likely to 
increase labor force participation (for those who are not working) because of positive 
substitution effect, and decrease hours of work for those already in the labor force and 
operating in the stationary range (due to negative income effects) or in the phase-out 
range (because of reinforcing substitution and income effects). However, it has 
ambiguous effects on hours of work for those who are working in the phase-in range due 
to offsetting substitution and income effects. 
Since the EITC phase-in schedule is steeper for families with more children (because of 
higher credit rates), one expects the labor force participation effects to be stronger as 
number of children increases. Similarly, a steeper phase-out schedule for families with 
two or more children implies that the negative substitution and income effects in the 
phase-out range would also be larger for these larger families than those with one or no 
child. As discussed earlier, the stationary range is wider for families with one or more 
children than those with no child. This would result in larger negative income effect for 
hours of work for families with children in the stationary range. The same could be said 
about married couples operating in the stationary range since their plateau also extends 
wider than single families for a given number of children. There are also important 
consequences for secondary earners of married couples. It can be argued that couples 
filing tax returns as ‘married jointly’ may face reduced EITC credits and higher tax 
liabilities than couples who file as ‘separated’ for the same amount of total income. This 
is known as the ‘marriage penalty’ of EITC in the literature. The benefit structure of 
EITC that rewards higher credit for families with children may also have impacts on 
fertility decisions of households. I attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the expansions 
in the EITC benefits in encouraging work among single mothers. 
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1.2 Review of Literature 
The policy changes of the 1990s have been among the most widely and thoroughly 
studied public policies in recent history as seen by the extensive volume of work done by 
researchers from various disciplines. Hotz and Scholz (2001) provide a discussion of the 
pros and cons of the different types of empirical approaches used to study the labor 
market effects of the EITC changes. According to their discussion, three of the most 
common approaches are:  
 “reduced form” effects, which examine the net effects of policy through observed 
changes in the policy; 
 “quasi-structural” models, which simulates how the EITC affects the after-tax 
wage and thus labor supply; and 
 “structural models” which posit and estimate specific models of preferences (e.g. 
specific utility functions) and constraints (e.g. kinks and other features of the 
budget line) facing consumers; 
My estimation technique is of the first category where reduced form effects of labor for 
participation is estimated after taking into consideration selection-corrected wage and 
child care costs. It is important to note that there is effectively no cross-state variation in 
the overall nature of the federal EITC program due to its uniform national eligibility and 
benefit structure. The State-EITC programs provide some cross-state variation. As a 
result, difference-in-difference methods have been generally used to evaluate the effects 
of the EITC. The main sources of identification are variations in the program parameters 
in two dimensions: time and family structure. These methods rely on explicit 
comparisons between groups that are and are not affected by the changes in EITC 
benefits. The commonly used “control” group is single women without children while the 
“treatment” group is single women with children. This analysis is based on two 
observations. Firstly, while the participation rates of single mothers have dramatically 
increased between 1994 and 1999, there is no such trend in the participation rate of the 
single women without children (refer to Figure 1). Secondly, as discussed above (refer to 
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Table 2) the budget bill of 1993 raised the EITC benefits significantly for families with 
two or more children during this period while only a small amount of credit was made 
available in 1994 for families without any children. The timing of the rapid expansions in 
the EITC, changes in welfare reforms, and the fact that these changes did not affect all 
persons equally, creates a natural experiment-type situation. The difference-in-difference 
methodology exploits this argument of natural experiment and attempts to investigate 
whether a causal relationship exists between the policy changes of the 1990s, including 
EITC expansions, and the changes in the participation rates. 
There is a large volume of work done examining the effects of the EITC on a range of 
behavioral issues: labor supply, income, poverty, human capital development, 
consumption decisions, marriage and fertility, health outcomes, and child achievements. 
Since the research objective in this study is to estimate effects of EITC on labor supply in 
the presence of child care costs, the discussion focuses on literature of these strands. 
 
1.2.1 Labor Force Participation of Single Mothers  
There is considerable evidence from a number of important studies using a variety of 
empirical methods that the EITC expansions increased the employment of single mothers. 
In one of the earliest studies, Eissa and Liebman (1996) analyzed data from the March 
Current Population Surveys (CPS) from 1985 to 1987 and 1989 to 1991, and found that 
the EITC had important effects on the employment of single women. According to their 
difference-in-difference estimates, the labor force participation of single mothers 
increased by up to 2.8 percentage points between 1984-86 and 1988-1990. While there 
were other policy and economic changes taking place during this period, Eissa and 
Liebman (1996) argued that the changes in the EITC benefit was likely to be the main 
reason for the estimated observed effect on labor supply of single mothers. Ellwood 
(2000) also uses the difference-in-difference approach and finds evidence of expanded 
work by single mothers, particularly for the least skilled group (constructed on the basis 
of predicted wage quartiles), due to the EITC expansion. An important study by Meyer 
and Rosenbaum (2001) estimated a large share of the EITC and other tax changes for the 
 
 
Page 23  
unprecedented increases in the employment of single mothers. Their results suggest 
smaller shares for welfare reforms such as lower benefit, welfare waivers, training 
programs and child care programs. According to their estimates based on the analysis of 
the March CPS files and the merged Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) data, EITC and 
other tax changes accounted for over 60 percent of the 1984 to 1996 increase in weekly 
and annual employment of single mothers relative to single women with without 
children. Changes in welfare reforms were found to be less important, but still accounted 
for a substantial part of the employment increases while contributions of other policy 
changes such as Medicaid, training, and child care programs were found to be 
considerably lower.  
A number of other studies, using recent panel data from the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP), also found substantial effects of the EITC expansions on 
labor force participation of women. Looney (2005) and Fitzgerald and Ribar (2004) are 
two recent studies that use the SIPP panels and conclude that the EITC expansions lead to 
less welfare use and increased work among single mothers. Grogger (2004) found that the 
expansion of the EITC was important in encouraging entry into work. EITC was also 
identified as a particularly important factor in explaining both the decrease in welfare use 
and the increase in employment, as well as earnings among female-headed families by 
Grogger (2003) where he relied on the March CPS data from 1979 to 2000. A general 
finding from these studies has been that the EITC expansions and the welfare reforms 
alone cannot explain all the changes in caseloads and employment in the 1990s. A recent 
study by Fang and Keane (2004), based on March CPS data from 1980 to 2002, 
attempted to completely account for the observed changes in caseloads and employment 
over the 1990s by a large set of economic and policy variables. According to their 
simulations, the EITC was the main policy variable contributing 33 percent of the 
increase in participation of single mothers, while work requirement component of the 
welfare reform accounted for an overwhelming 57 percent of the drop in welfare 
participation rate of single mothers. However, their reliance on a complex set of 
interaction terms and interpretations have been subject to criticisms (Blank, 2009). 
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Hotz, Mullin, and Scholz (2005) created an exclusive dataset by matching administrative 
data from public assistance records, unemployment insurance records, and federal tax 
returns for a sample of California residents to examine the employment effects of the 
EITC. They compare employment rates of families with two or more children relative to 
one-child families for those who file tax returns (and claim the EITC credits) versus those 
who don’t file tax returns (hence don’t claim the EITC credits). The reason for comparing 
these two groups was due to the fact that the budget bill of 1993 raised the EITC benefits 
significantly for families with two or more children. Comparing those who file (and 
hence claim the credit) with those who do not, allows the authors to estimate the effect of 
EITC expansions on the participation of families with two or more children relative to 
one-child families. Their estimates suggest that the EITC expansions had substantial 
positive effect on the employment of families with two or more children compared to 
single-child families. 
In contrast, several other studies estimate that the changes in the EITC had little effect on 
labor supply of single mothers. Cancian and Levinson (2006) examine the effect of EITC 
on labor supply by comparing families with three children to families with two children 
in Wisconsin (which supplements the federal EITC for families with three children by 
$1,107) versus states that do not supplement the federal EITC for three children. Their 
cross-state comparison found no effect of the EITC on labor force participation of single 
mothers with three children relative to single mothers with two children in Wisconsin. 
While their findings seems to differ from previous estimates, the authors argue that there 
might be less unmeasured differences between their comparison groups (single mothers 
with three children versus single mothers with two children) as opposed to those of 
previous studies - single mothers versus single women with no children – and hence their 
estimates might be correctly measuring the impact of EITC on participation and hours of 
work. They also state that Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) found similar (small or no 
effects) results when they compared mothers with different number of children. However, 
the authors note that employment decisions of larger families might be more influenced 
by non-pecuniary costs and benefits of employment leading to less sensitivity towards 
EITC. Furthermore, since Wisconsin already had high employment rates prior to the 
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EITC expansions, there was little room for increasing employment further by these 
expansions. 
In another study, Fitzpatrick and Thompson (2009) examined how the labor force 
participation of single mothers is affected when the federal EITC interacts with the cost-
of-living. Their findings showed positive effects of EITC changes on labor force 
participation of single mothers in the lowest housing cost areas, but no significant impact 
in the highest housing cost areas. As a result, the authors raised questions about the 
effectiveness of EITC in addressing unemployment problems in large cities where the 
cost-of-living (in terms of housing cost) is high. Findings from my estimation indicate a 
different phenomenon where single mothers facing higher child care costs experienced 
significant increase in participation relative to those facing lower child care costs. 
Most of these studies have also examined the magnitude and consequences of the implied 
elasticity of employment due to effects of EITC with respect to a household’s net income 
and/or net wage. Hotz and Scholz (2003) report that the range of the implied participation 
elasticity for single mothers across studies of EITC using difference-in-difference method 
is from 0.97 to 1.69, and 0.69 to 0.96 using structural models. In a review of recent 
literature on labor supply elasticity, McClelland (2012) report that the EIC literature’s 
estimate of participation elasticity is higher than those of other general studies. One 
probable explanation for this finding is that low-income women with children have low 
initial participation and hence when EITC credit limits expand, there is room for large 
increases in their participation. However, this analysis does not consider the effects of 
child care costs. Findings from my research suggest that there is variation in the 
participation elasticity across the distribution of child care costs. My estimates show that 
the increase in participation in the post-expansion period of EITC mostly came from 
those women facing high child care costs and hence indicating relatively high elasticity 
of participation for women facing high child care costs 
1.2.2 Labor Supply of Married Couples 
It has discussed earlier that there are important consequences of EITC for secondary 
earners of married couples. It has been argued that EITC has a ‘marriage penalty’ since 
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couples filing tax returns as ‘married jointly’ may face reduced EITC credits and higher 
tax liabilities than couples who file as ‘separated’ for the same amount of total income. 
This phenomenon is likely to have negative participation effects for secondary earners for 
married couples. 
Eissa and Hoynes (1998) find modest negative effects of the EITC on labor market 
participation of married women. Eissa and Hoynes (2004) examine the labor force 
participation response of married couples between 1984 and 1996 using quasi-
experimental and traditional reduced-form labor supply models. Their estimated results 
suggest that the EITC expansions reduced total family labor supply of married couples. 
Bar and Oksana (2009) examine a model of heterogeneous households and also find 
similar negative effect of EITC participation, especially among married couples with 
low-earning husbands. Results from Ellwood (2000) suggest reductions in work by 
married mothers as well. 
My study design involves estimating participation effects for single mothers, as opposed 
to married women. The reasons are clear. Even though the participation of women was on 
the rise during most of the 1990s, married women’s labor force participation declined 
during this period as the findings of the above studies indicate. It is the single mothers 
who experienced the most dramatic increase in participation in the 1990s (Mosissa and 
Hipple, 2006). As a result, I decided to work with single mothers and investigate the 
causes behind this phenomenon. 
1.2.3 Hours of Work 
As discussed earlier, a wider stationary range for married couples would, in theory, result 
in larger negative income effect for hours of work for families with children in the 
stationary range. A limited number of studies have looked at the effect of EITC on those 
already working in the labor force, namely on hours of work. Most of the studies find no 
or little negative effect. Eissa and Liebman (1996) found no change in the relative hours 
worked by low-educated single mothers, conditional on working. Meyer and Rosenbaum 
(1999) find mixed, but insignificant impacts on hours worked. Focusing on the phase-out 
range of the EITC in the Current Population Survey Data cases, a recent study by Trampe 
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(2007) show a small negative effect on hours worked for the population in the phase-out 
range. However, some studies indicate that the aggregate effect of the EITC on hours 
worked could be positive, once we account for the participation effects (Dickert, Houser 
and Scholz, 1995; Keane and Moffitt, 1998; and Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001). Thus I 
focus on participation effects of the EITC and examine labor supply at the extensive 
margin for single mothers. 
1.2.4 Labor Supply and Child Care Costs 
There are also a number of studies that provide estimates of the effect of the price of 
child care on labor supply. Considering access to child care as one of the determinants of 
female labor supply, this literature has focused on estimating the impact of child care 
costs on the labor supply of women. However, none of these studies are in the context of 
the EITC, particularly the interaction between EITC and child care costs and the resulting 
impacts on labor supply. 
This literature has been reviewed extensively in Anderson and Levine (2000), Blau 
(2003b), Connelly (1991), and Ross (1998). Chaplin et al. (1999) provide a review of the 
literature on the effect of the price of child care on various modes of child care choice. 
These studies almost uniformly show negative price effects on employment (i.e. maternal 
labor force participation increases when the price of child care falls), implying that child 
care subsidies will indeed increase employment (see Connelly and Kimmel, 2003. Riber, 
1992; Michalopoulos et.al, 1992; Blau and Robins (1991)). Anderson and Levine (2000) 
discuss that the estimated employment elasticities with respect to a change in the cost of 
child care across studies range from just over zero to almost one, with some clustering 
around -0.3 to -0.4.  They argue that the lack of low cost child care may be a crucial 
determinant for the employment decisions of the less-skilled women. Using the SIPP 
data, they examine child care decisions of women who differ by their level of skill, as 
measured by their level of education, and the role of child care costs on their labor force 
participation. They find elasticity of labor force participation with respect to child care 
costs in the range of -0.05 and -0.35 for women with children under 13, with this 
elasticity declining with the skill level. In other words, labor force participation of high 
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educated mothers is less sensitive to increases in child care costs according to their 
findings. Blau and Currie (2006) summarize results from twenty studies estimated the 
effect of paid child care on employment of mothers. They show that while in all studies, 
lowering the price of childcare increases mother’s labor force participation, estimates of 
this elasticity vary significantly even within studies using the same source of data. In 
their view, specification and estimation issues are the main reasons behind the wide range 
of estimates for elasticity. Nevertheless, based on studies that modeled for unpaid child 
care in accordance with the existence of an informal care option, the authors suspect that 
the true elasticity may be small. 
A second strain of the child care literature investigates the impact on the labor supply and 
welfare dependence of single mothers (Garfinkel et al.  1990; Michalopoulos et al. 1992; 
Connelly  1990; Berger and Black 1992; Kimmel 1995). The majority of these studies 
indicate that lower child care costs not only significantly increase women’s labor supply, 
but also reduce welfare caseloads. 
In brief, investigation of the large research literature on labor supply provides evidence 
that the EITC encourages labor force participation, particularly among single mothers. 
There is also evidence that it has a modest negative effect on labor supply of married 
couples or secondary earners. Most of the evidence on hours of work suggests that the 
EITC has a small negative or no effect, but there are mixed results as well. The 
participation effect of the EITC is also substantial in terms of explaining the observed 
changes in labor force participation of single mothers, as suggested by the estimated 
results of the studies. A number of studies estimate that the EITC was more important 
than the welfare reform in explaining the increase in participation of single mothers 
during the 1990s. The literature on child care costs finds negative impact on female labor 
supply indicating lower child care costs increase women’s labor supply. This literature 
also suggests that lower child care costs reduce welfare dependence. However, the best 
available estimates suggest that the effects of the price of paid child care on labor force 
participation, hours of work, and welfare use are small. 
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Even though the effect of child care costs on labor supply, and the effect of EITC on 
labor supply have been well researched as separate strands of research, the interaction 
between the EITC and child care costs have not been investigated in the literature. An 
attempt has been made in this study to estimate the labor force participation effects of the 
EITC by explicitly incorporating child care costs in the decision to work. 
 
1.3 Theoretical Framework, Empirical Estimation, and Identification Issues 
A number of approaches have been applied in modeling the effect of child care costs as 
fixed costs on labor supply. The following simple model adapted from Ribar (1992) 
where the hours of non-market/market child care demanded and hours worked are results 
of utility maximizing behaviors by representative households. 
1.3.1 Theoretical Framework 
The representative household is assumed to be maximizing utility over a market good and 
leisure, a fixed portion of which is devoted to maternal care. 
Suppose, a representative single mother with N children has preferences over leisure (L), 
market goods (C) and average quality of child care (Q/N) where Q is a measure of quality 
of child care and N is the number of children. Household preference is represented by 
strictly concave utility function, U = U(C, Q/N, L). It is assumed that caring for children 
yields utility and utility is increasing in C, L and Q/L ( )0,0,0 /  NQLC UUU . 
Mothers are assumed to spend working in the market by H hours. Since the maximum 
available time is T, the time constraint is 
(1) T = H + L 
Since information on maternal child care is unavailable, it is assumed to be a proportion 
of L. The children can also receive non-maternal care (paid or unpaid) outside the home. 
Let F denote total hours of paid market child care demanded. Total hours of non-maternal 
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unpaid care are denoted by I. The total quality of care provided to child j can be 
expressed as: 
( )                      
 
 
 
where αF, αI, αT are productivity coefficients of paid non-maternal care, unpaid non-
maternal care and maternal care, respectively. The linear specification assumes that 
quality of a non-maternal care does not depend on utilization of that mode. 
Given W as the mother’s hourly wage rate, the convex budget set, in terms of the market 
goods, could be written as 
(3a) C = WH + V – p = Y – pF- sI 
where V is non-labor income, Y is total income, p represents the cost of hourly child care 
(assumed to be given for the household) and s is the shadow price of unpaid non-maternal 
care. Earnings of all other members of household are included in V and assumed to be 
exogenous for the mother. This is the budget constraint faced by each household with 
children in the absence of any EITC benefit.  
We can incorporate the EITC credit in this model as a supplement to the wage income 
since it is effectively like a wage subsidy. Since the amount of the EITC benefit varies 
based on the three ranges, the budget set takes the following forms for a single parent 
with two qualifying children (N = 2) based on the 2010 schedule: 
(3b) Phase-in range: C = WH + V + o.4(WH) – pF- sI 
(3c) Stationary range: C = WH + V + 5,036 – pF - sI 
(3d) Phase-out range: C = WH + V + [5,036 – 0.2106(WH – 16,450)] – pF -sI 
In general, the budget constraint could be written as 
(4) C = WH + V + E – pF = Y + E – pF - sI  
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where E is the amount of the EITC credit, which is a function of labor-income (WH), 
number of children (N), and filing (or marital) status. 
The objective of the household is to  
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subject to non-negativity constraints for the choice variables: H, F/N and I/N. First order 
conditions of this maximization problem will yield demand functions for H 
(employment) and F/N (non-maternal paid care). Setting H=0 and F/N=0 in the first 
order conditions will lead to expressions for mother’s reservation wage as well as 
reservation marginal price of child care. These are as follows: 
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The predictions of this model suggest that wages and labor force participation are 
positively related, while an increase in the marginal price of child care leads to a decrease 
in the demand for paid non-maternal care. Similarly, an increase in the shadow price of 
unpaid non-maternal care is expected to reduce the demand for such services. 
 
1.3.2 Empirical Estimation and Identification 
The solution to the maximization problem would generate mothers’ labor force 
participation (H) as a function of wages (W), the EITC benefit (E), number of children 
(N), unearned income (V), and cost of paid non-maternal child care (P). It would also 
yield a demand function for non-maternal child care as a function of these variables. The 
reduced form solutions are: 
(8) H = f (W, E, N, V, P, Z,  ); 
 
 
Page 32  
(9) F = g (E, N, V, P, Z,  );  
where Z is a vector of observed characteristics of the mother, and   and  are 
unobserved determinants. 
The specific employment and child care usage decisions are represented by 
(10a) H
*
 = f (W, E, N, V, P, Z,  ) 
(10b) H =  {1 (works), if H
*
 >0 
         {0 (doesn’t work), otherwise. 
Also, 
(11a) F
*
 = g (H, E, N, V, P, Z,  ) 
(11b) F =  { F
*
 (uses non-parental care), if F
*
 >0 
  {0 (doesn’t use non-parental care), otherwise. 
The joint distribution of the   and  are assumed to be given by 
(12) 







~ N  ,0  
The ultimate goal is to estimate probability of labor force participation as a function of 
EITC credit expansions, wages, child care costs and demographic variables. To do that, 
data on wages and child care costs for all women, regardless of their employment or child 
care payment status, is required. However, both wages and child care costs are 
endogenous since observed wages and child care costs do not fully capture all of the 
relevant demand information and may be correlated with unobservable characteristics 
included in the error terms (   ). Additionally, wages are not observed for mothers who 
do not work, and cost of non-maternal child care is not observed for those mothers who 
do not use these services. Child care costs are not observed for unemployed mothers in 
earlier panels of SIPP, particularly for samples before 1996.  
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The presence of the above two phenomenon mean that there is endogeneity problem and 
sample selection bias. Therefore, I approach the analysis in several approaches. First, 
using the exogenous determinants of participation and use of paid child care, a reduced 
form specification for joint labor force participation and child care model is estimated. 
Second, selection corrected wages and costs of child care equations are estimated. 
Finally, using the selection corrected wage and cost estimates as instruments, a structural 
equation for labor force participation is estimated to obtain the effects of these variables 
(as well as EITC) on participation. Table 1.3 provides a summary of the three-step 
estimation approach with exclusion variables. 
 
Table 1.3 Variables included in various stages of the estimation 
First Stage Bivariate Probit Model 
 
Second Stage Selection-corrected 
Model 
Final Stage Probit 
 
Employment 
Usage of Paid 
Care 
Hourly wage 
Weekly Cost of 
Care 
Employment 
Age Age Age Age - 
Age squared Age squared Age-squared - - 
Disabled - Disabled - Disabled 
High School High School High school High school - 
Some college Some college Some college Some college - 
College College College College - 
Post college Post college Post-college Post-college - 
Naturalized Naturalized Naturalized Naturalized Naturalized 
Not naturalized Not naturalized Not naturalized Not naturalized Not naturalized 
Married (sps ab.) Married (sps ab.) 
Married (sps 
ab.) 
Married (sps 
ab.) 
Married (sps ab.) 
Widowed Widowed Widowed Widowed Widowed 
Divorced Divorced Divorced Divorced Divorced 
Separated Separated Separated Separated Separated 
Never married Never married Never married Never married - 
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Table 1.3 Variables included in various stages of the estimation (Continued) 
First Stage Bivariate Probit Model 
 
Second Stage Selection-corrected 
Model 
Final Stage Probit 
 
Employment 
Usage of Paid 
Care 
Hourly wage 
Weekly Cost of 
Care 
Employment 
Black Black Black Black Black 
Hispanic Hispanic Hispanic Hispanic Hispanic 
Other race Other race Other race Other race Other race 
Other adults Other adults - - - 
- - Metro Metro - 
No. of own kids No. of own kids - - No. of own kids 
No. of infants No. of infants - No. of infants No. of infants 
No of kids below 
5 
No of kids below 
5 
- 
No. of kids 
below 5 
No of kids below 5 
- No. of kids 6-12 - - - 
- No. of kids 13-17 - 
No. of kids13-
17 
- 
No-labor income No-labor income - - No-labor income 
Property income Property income - - Property income 
State EITC -    
Workers 
compensation 
Workers 
compensation 
- - - 
State 
unemployment 
rate 
State 
unemployment 
rate 
- - State unemployment rate 
AFDC benefit 
(2person) 
AFDC benefit 
(2person) 
- - AFDC benefit (2person) 
AFDC benefit 
(3person) 
AFDC benefit 
(3person) 
- - AFDC benefit (3person) 
- - - - Predicted wage (hr) 
- - - - Predicted cost (wk) 
- - - - treatment 
- - - - post96 
- - - - treatment*post96 
- - - - treatment*cost 
- - - - cost*post96 
- - - - treatment*cost*post96 
 
In particular, the following equations are going to be estimated to investigate the effects 
of the EITC expansions on labor supply in the presence of child care costs. 
First stage Equations: 
(13a) Reduced Form Participation:  Pr[(H = 1)|M,V) 
 
 
Page 35  
where M  includes observed variables such as age, age squared, education, race, etc. The 
suggested identifiers for this equation of probability of employment are: non-labor 
income, young children of various age groups, presence of other adults in the house and, 
state variables regarding AFDC/TANF benefits, estimated workers’ compensation (a 
state policy variable), unemployment rate and presence of state EITC. These variables do 
not appear in the wage equation (14a). 
(13b) Reduced Form Usage of Paid Child Care: Pr (F
*
 >0)|D, Family characteristics)  
where D is the vector of observed variables affecting the probability of using non-
maternal childcare such as age, years of education, non-labor income, race, number of 
kids in various age groups, presence of other adults, health status of the mother, state 
variables regarding AFDC benefits. The childcare expenses equation is identified by the 
presence of other adults and teens in the house. These two variables do not appear in the 
cost of childcare equation (14b). 
These two equations in the first-stage are going to be jointly estimated using a bi-variate 
probit model to jointly estimate the decision equations since it is likely that mothers make 
the two decisions simultaneously. Based on the Mills Ratios constructed from this first 
stage bi-variate probit estimate, correction terms are generated for the hourly wage and 
weekly expenses of childcare so that a selection-corrected wage equation and a demand 
equation for paid child care could be estimated in the second-stage. 
Second Stage Equations: 
(14a) Selection Corrected Wage:  W = S  
where S is the set of variables that affects wage and is a subset of M (from 13a) in order 
to identify this equation. For example, it includes variables such as education, age, age 
squared, marital status, citizenship status, race, health status, metro residence, and inverse 
mills ratio (computed from the first stage bi-variate estimates).  represents unobserved 
determinants of wages. 
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(14b) Selection Corrected Cost of Child Care:  p = K  
where K is a vector of variables affecting childcare expenses and similarly is a subset of 
D (from 13b) in order to identify the equation for childcare expenses. In particular, we 
exclude presence of other adults and teens in the house from this equation. The control 
variables included in this equation are age, education, citizenship status, marital status, 
race, number of infants, number of children in various age groups, metro residence, and 
inverse mills ratio.   is the set of unobserved factors that affects the cost of childcare. 
Final Stage Equation: 
(15)Structural Equation for Participation: Pr (H = 1)| 
))ˆ*96*()96*(96ˆˆ( 543210 pPostTreatmentPostTreatmentPostTreatmentpWQ    
In the final step, a Probit model is used to estimate the probability of employment 
utilizing the predicted wage and predicted childcare expenses, among others, from the 
second-stage results. I attempt to capture the EITC expansions included in the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93) through the dichotomous variable, Post96 
where Post96 = 1 if the reference time period is after 1996 and 0 otherwise. Recall that 
the expansions of the EITC were implemented in phases in 1994, 1995 and 1996. As a 
result, the dichotomous variable, Post96 reflects the period before and after EITC 
expansions.  
Here, Q is a set of variables that affect the probability of labor force participation. It 
excludes some variables that arguably affect either the probability of using non-parental 
childcare, or wages, or the cost of childcare, but does not affect the probability of 
employment. Following Connelly and Kimmel (2003), the following variables are 
excluded from this final equation due to identification requirements: presence of other 
adults, education, state regulations regarding employers estimated workers’ 
compensation. While many of these are also suggested in other studies, the exclusion of 
age, age squared, and education from the final equation may be arguable.  
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The treatment group is single mothers with at least one child under 18 and this group is 
compared with the control group – never married women without children. There are two 
groups of women who constitute the ‘usual’ control groups in existing literature: single 
women with no children, single women who dropped out of high school and have no 
children. These groups included women who are either widowed or separated or divorced 
or never married. All these groups of women tend to show little change in their labor 
force participation during the 1990s. However, assets and non-labor resources of 
widowed/separated/divorced women may differ from those of never married women. 
Furthermore, the widowed/separated/divorced women may represent different choices 
regarding having children than the never married women. As a result, I have chosen the 
never married women without any children as the ‘control’ group whose labor force 
participation would be compared with that of the single mothers. However, some analysis 
has been done using the other control groups for purposes of comparison. 
Though my primary interest are the difference-in-difference estimators 
4  and 5 , due to 
the presence of several interaction terms we need to consider the partial derivative of the 
dependent variable (labor force participation) with respect to the treatment group, 
evaluated at the average predicted childcare expenses, to find out how single mothers 
change their labor force participation relative to never married women without children 
after the EITC expansions till 1996. Everything else being the same, we expect higher 
costs of childcare to reduce the effectiveness of the EITC program on labor force 
participation of single mothers, i.e. dampen the increase in labor force participation of 
single mothers.  
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2 DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
The sample of women for my research comes from the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP).   This dataset has been selected primarily because it collects detail 
information on the variables of my interest, particularly on child care expenses, labor 
force participation and taxes including EITC claims. Current Population Survey (CPS) 
does not have information about child care modes and expenses. As a result, I have 
selected SIPP panels of 1992, 1993, 1996 and 2001 to cover the policy period under 
consideration when maximum credits of EITC were increased substantially in 1993 and 
implemented in phases till 1996 (described above in Section 1.1, Table 1.2). In particular, 
the following panels and waves of the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP) were drawn: 
 
Table 2.1 SIPP Panels Covered 
Panel Wave Reference Time Period Topical Module 
1992 6 Sept  93 – Dec 93 Child care 
1992 8 (Research) May 94 – Aug 94 Taxes 
    
1993 3 Sept  93 – Dec 93 Child Care 
1993 5 (Research) May 94 – Aug 94 Taxes 
1993 6 Sept 94 – Dec 95 Child Care 
1993 8 (Research) May  95 – Aug 95 Taxes 
    
1996 4 March 97 – June 97 Taxes, Child Care 
1996 10 March 99 – June 99 Taxes, Child Care 
    
2001 4 Jan 02 – Apr 02 Taxes, Child Care 
    
 
The programs for cleaning and pulling these panels have been downloaded from the 
website of the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) 
(http://www.ceprdata.org/sipp/sipp_data.php) while the raw data was downloaded from 
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (http://www.nber.org/data/sipp.html) 
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website.  Using the programs from CEPR, I matched information from the ‘topical’ 
modules on childcare with the detail labor force, income and demographic information 
from the ‘core’ modules. Since the CEPR programs do not cover the tax modules, the 
‘topical’ modules relating to ‘taxes’ were match-merged with the rest of the data to 
provide a complete set of information relating to demographics, childcare and EITC 
variables. In addition, a set of state-level policy variables relating to economic and 
program transfer information (from the website of UKCPR) was merged with these files 
as a final step in data preparation.  
The SIPP is a multistage-stratified sample covering the U.S. civilian non-institutionalized 
population.  Interviews are attempted for all household members 15 years of age and 
older, with the option of proxy responses when household members are unavailable for 
interviewing. The survey design consists of a continuous series of national panels, with 
new panels (having a new set of sample households) being introduced periodically. The 
sample size in a panel ranges from approximately 14,000 to 36,700 interviewed 
households. The duration of each panel varies from thirty-two (32) months to forty-eight 
(48) months. More information on SIPP is available at the website of the Census Bureau 
(http://www.census.gov/sipp/overview.html).  
The SIPP has two modules: Core and Topical. The “core modules” ask questions relating 
to labor force, program participation, and income with an objective to measure economic 
conditions of people.  The "topical modules" are additional questions on a variety of 
topics not covered in the core section and are assigned to particular interviewing waves of 
the survey only. Topics covered by the topical modules include personal history, child 
care, wealth, program eligibility, child support, utilization and cost of health care, 
disability, school enrollment, taxes, and annual income.  
The SIPP survey uses a 4-month recall period (called a ‘wave’), with approximately the 
same number of random subsamples being interviewed in each month of the 4-month 
period of each wave. Thus, each sample member is interviewed every 4 months for the 
duration of a panel, with information about the previous 4-month period collected in each 
interview. Due to this interview structure, data from only the fourth month of each 
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relevant wave was analyzed. The topical modules of child care questions refer to 
childcare arrangements of the “last month”. The User Guide of SIPP recommends using 
the fourth reference month of current wave when the survey questions refer to 
arrangements in the previous month (https://www.census.gov/sipp/usrguide/sipp2001.pdf 
, page 273).  
 
2.1 Demographic Summary Statistics of Single Mothers and Single Women 
Since the research topic is to analyze labor force participation of single mothers as 
compared to single women, the sample consists of only females, within the age group of 
18-60 years. The choice of this age group is to consider the working age women. My 
treatment group is single women (either married but spouse absent, single, divorced, or 
never married) with at least one child below age 18. The control group consists of single 
women (never married) who do not have any child (below age 18) of their own.  
In order to get robust estimates of the predicted wage and price of childcare from a larger 
sample, the first-stage bi-variate probit equations (joint reduced form labor force 
participation and use of paid child care) as well as the second-stage selection-corrected 
equations (on wage and cost of child care) have been run on a sample consisting of 
married women, single mothers and never married women (with no children). As a result, 
married women with spouses present were also included in the initial sample. The final-
stage analysis of labor force participation was conducted on only the treatment and 
control group of women. 
Table 2.2 presents the mean values of the variables included in the analysis for the three 
categories of women between the ages 18 to 60 years as described above: single mothers, 
single women, and all women (including married women with spouse present) for all the 
panels. The summary statistics show that 57.67% of the sample is married women with 
spouses present, while 18.34% are women without spouse or widowed or divorced or 
separated and, 23.99% are never married women. Out of the total sample of 109,935 
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women, 16,626 are single mothers (treatment group) and 17,364 are single women 
(control group). 
Table 2.2 Demographic Statistics of Single Mothers and Never Married Women: All 
Panels 
 
All Women (including 
married, spouse present) 
Single Mothers Never Married 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Demographics 
      age 37.76 11.5213 31.22 10.0462 28.84 9.9465 
Number of other adults 2.15 0.9596 1.83 1.1387 2.15 1.3331 
No of own children 0.90 1.1593 1.75 0.9921 0.00 0.0000 
Family's other income (1997 $) 285.12 847.8093 270.52 560.5762 293.22 882.3908 
Family's property income (1997 
$) 98.33 425.4070 36.57 243.1879 79.31 381.3848 
Disabled 0.09 0.0009 0.09 0.0022 0.09 0.0022 
Less than high school 0.14 0.0010 0.23 0.0033 0.11 0.0024 
High school 0.32 0.0014 0.33 0.0036 0.24 0.0033 
Some college 0.32 0.0014 0.35 0.0037 0.36 0.0036 
College 0.19 0.0012 0.08 0.0021 0.24 0.0032 
Post-college 0.04 0.0006 0.01 0.0009 0.04 0.0015 
Native 0.85 0.0011 0.86 0.0027 0.85 0.0027 
Naturalized 0.04 0.0006 0.03 0.0013 0.02 0.0012 
Not-naturalized 0.07 0.0007 0.07 0.0020 0.05 0.0016 
Married, spouse present 0.58 0.0015 0.00 0.0000 0.00 0.0000 
Married, spouse absent 0.01 0.0003 0.03 0.0013 0.00 0.0000 
Widowed 0.02 0.0005 0.04 0.0015 0.00 0.0000 
Divorced 0.12 0.0010 0.30 0.0036 0.00 0.0000 
Separated 0.03 0.0005 0.12 0.0025 0.00 0.0000 
Never married 0.24 0.0013 0.51 0.0039 1.00 0.0000 
White 0.73 0.0013 0.54 0.0039 0.70 0.0035 
Black 0.12 0.0010 0.26 0.0034 0.16 0.0028 
Hispanic 0.11 0.0009 0.17 0.0029 0.09 0.0021 
Otherace 0.04 0.0006 0.04 0.0015 0.05 0.0016 
Metro 0.78 0.0012 0.79 0.0031 0.83 0.0029 
Employment 
      Proportion in labor force 0.67 0.0014 0.64 0.0037 0.74 0.0033 
Wage per hour  (1997 $) 11.86 12.1056 9.56 8.9661 10.77 9.3616 
Hours worked per week 24.00 19.1988 21.97 18.7666 26.43 18.5702 
Full-time work 0.63 0.4827 0.57 -- 0.62 -- 
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Table 2.2 Demographic Statistics of Single Mothers and Never Married Women: All 
Panels (Continued) 
 
All Women (including 
married, spouse present) 
Single Mothers Never Married 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Child Care 
      Total cost per week((1997 $) 79.27 68.5918 67.20 57.2653 
  (Observations) 8832 
     Proportion paying for care 0.08 0.0008 0.12 0.0025 
  No. of Observations 109935 
 
16626 
 
17364 
 Values are in constant 1997 dollars. 
It is seen that approximately 67% of the 109,935 women in the full sample have a job. 
About 64% of the treatment group (single mothers) has a job, while 74% of the control 
group (single women) are working. This is consistent with overall trends in participation 
of single mothers and never married women. In general, participation rate of never 
married women is found to be higher than that of single mothers. Average weekly 
working hours for the full sample of women is 24 hours. However, the single mothers 
work fewer hours than the single women (22 hours vs. 26 hours) and hence a smaller 
proportion of the single mothers work full-time (40 or more hours per week). 
Additionally, they (single mothers) earn a lower average hourly wage than the single 
women ($9.56 vs. $10.77) in constant 1997 dollars. 
Single mothers are 31 years of age on average, and most likely to have some college 
education (35%) while a third of them are high school graduates. Single women are 
younger in age (29 years) and also most like to hold some college education (36%). 
However, they are approximately three times more likely than single mothers to have 
completed college (24% vs 8%)  and four times more likely to have post-college 
education (4% vs. 1%).  
A higher proportion of single women are likely to be White (70% vs.  54%). A higher 
proportion of single mothers are, however, likely to be Black or of Hispanic origin. 
Single mothers and single women predominantly live in a metro (79% and 83%, 
respectively) and, are mostly native-born (86% and 85% respectively). A higher 
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proportion of the single mothers (7% vs. 5%) are immigrants who have not become 
citizens.  
Both single mothers and single women have about two other adults present in their family 
This may be due to the presence of other family members or sharing of a rental unit with 
other adults. Single women have higher average monthly real non-labor income than 
single mothers ($293.22 vs. $270.52). Additionally, they have higher stream of monthly 
property income ($79.31 vs. $36.57). However, there is substantial variation in both of 
these categories of income (non-labor and property income) as evidenced by the high 
standard deviation. It is worth noting that SIPP divides household cash-income into four 
categories: earned, property, transfers and other. Non-cash income includes food stamp, 
WIC, and energy assistance. 
2.2 Summary Statistics of Modes of Childcare Usage and Expenditures 
Looking at the child-related variables, it is seen that single mothers have on average 
about two children less than 18 years of age. Out of the single mothers, 12.14% are 
making out-of-pocket payments for the usage of childcare services. This may reflect the 
usage of informal and subsidized childcare services as well as assistance from other 
sources. 
Broadly, there are six different types of childcare arrangements that have been created by 
out of the responses for the childcare questions in SIPP. These, as described in user notes 
for the childcare module, are: 
Family Care: This includes non-relative care outside the child’s home; for instance, 
family daycare and informal care facilities in someone’s home. 
Formal Day Care: This type refers to formal day care centers and is not situated in a 
home. For example, it includes daycare, nursery school, and Head Start/ pre-school for 
young children; for older children, it includes daycare, sports, lessons, clubs, and after-
school care. 
Nanny/Sitter: This is for non-relative care inside a child’s home. 
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Relative: This category refers to siblings over age 15 years, grandparents, or other 
relatives taking care of a child either inside the home or outside the home. 
Parent/Guardian: This is either parent/guardian respondent of a child or other 
parent/guardian caring the child at home or at workplace of the parent/guardian. 
Self Care: This means the child is taking care of himself/herself or is cared for by 
siblings 15 years or younger. 
My analysis of the SIPP data on childcare arrangement refers to only the primary mode 
of arrangement (i.e. the childcare arrangement with the maximum number of hours for a 
child)  for the three youngest children, broken down into two age groups: children under 
6 years of age and children 6 years or older. Even though recent panels (since 1996) 
expand the childcare arrangement questions to more children/more types of 
arrangements, I was unable to utilize this additional information due to lack of 
consistency/availability in the earlier panels (1992, 1993). With respect to the payment 
variables, the amounts show the total amount paid by a parent (in constant 1997 dollars), 
on average, for a particular mode of child care arrangement, which is broken down along 
the two age groups: all children under the age of six (for a parent), and all children six 
years of age of older (for a parent). 
Table 2.3 provides detail information regarding childcare usage and expenditures by 
various modes for all the single mothers, further disaggregated by their employment 
status. In general, it is seen that working single mothers are more likely to use child care 
arrangements relative to non-working single mothers. It is observed that relative care is 
the primary mode of arrangement for single mothers, both employed and unemployed 
regardless of the age of children. Similar findings are reported by Connelly and Kimmel 
(2002). They comment that this pattern of choice is consistent with the employment 
pattern of single mothers, who typically work part-time (as seen by their average work 
hours in Table 2). In addition, it provides greater flexibility to meet non-traditional work 
hours. According to Washington State Department of Early Learning, family, friend and 
neighbor providers – commonly known as FFN care – is the most common type of care 
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around the nation for infants, toddlers and school-age children before and after school. 
People choose FFN care for a variety of reasons such as existing bonds of love, shared 
language, culture, religion and values, presence of a special- needs child, cost etc. Their 
research also suggest that FFN providers do this work primarily because they enjoy being 
with children and they like helping the parents. This explains why only 23.52% of single 
mothers, who use relative care for a child under six years of age, make a payment for 
such services. This proportion is slightly higher for the working single mothers (27.37%), 
nevertheless still small compared to Family Care, Formal Care or Care by a Nanny/Baby 
Sitter. 
For children under six years of age, formal day care is the second major mode of 
childcare arrangement for single mothers (whether working or not), followed by family 
care. However, this is not the case for children six or older; for this group of children, 
self-care is the second major mode for both working and non-working single mothers. 
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Table 2.3 Childcare Arrangements of Single Mothers (All Panels) 
 
Single Mothers (All) Single Mothers (working) Single Mothers (not working) 
Child Under 6 Child 6 or older Child Under 6 Child 6 or older Child Under 6 Child 6 or older 
Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev 
Usage of Modes (proportion):            
Family Care 0.1236 0.0052 0.0684 0.0034 0.1592 0.0070 0.0828 0.0044 0.0501 0.0059 0.0279 0.0043 
Formal Day Care 0.2688 0.0069 0.1394 0.0047 0.3138 0.0089 0.1560 0.0058 0.1759 0.0102 0.0930 0.0076 
Nanny/Sitter 0.0319 0.0027 0.0348 0.0025 0.0370 0.0036 0.0400 0.0031 0.0213 0.0039 0.0203 0.0037 
Relative care 0.3509 0.0075 0.3047 0.0063 0.3704 0.0093 0.3417 0.0076 0.3107 0.0124 0.2008 0.0105 
Parent/Guardian  0.0716 0.0040 0.0762 0.0036 0.0844 0.0054 0.0947 0.0047 0.0450 0.0056 0.0243 0.0040 
Self care 0.0065 0.0013 0.1694 0.0051 0.0061 0.0015 0.1885 0.0062 0.0072 0.0023 0.1160 0.0084 
No of Observations 4081 5402 2698 3935 1383 1467 
Pay for care of those who use (proportion): 
Family Care 0.8301 0.0170 0.7321 0.0236 0.8666 0.0164 0.7600 0.0240 0.5905 0.0646 0.5000 0.0845 
(No of Observations) 490 353 431 317 59 36 
Formal Day Care 0.7199 0.0141 0.6626 0.0173 0.7901 0.0143 0.6902 0.0187 0.4614 0.0353 0.5328 0.0438 
(No of Observations) 1016 746 815 615 201 131 
Nanny/Sitter 0.5100 0.0437 0.4598 0.0378 0.5306 0.0480 0.4820 0.0404 0.4358 0.1057 0.3374 0.1057 
(No of Observations) 132 175 109 154 23 21 
Relative care 0.2352 0.0114 0.1325 0.0084 0.2737 0.0142 0.1449 0.0097 0.1405 0.0173 0.0732 0.0152 
(No of Observations) 1395 1623 990 1330 405 293 
Weekly expenditure of those who pay (1997 $) 
Family Care 65.46 45.90 56.33 52.85 66.47 43.62 59.26 54.98 56.89 62.67 32.62 18.10 
(No of Observations) 236 148 214 134 22 14 
Formal Day Care 72.91 59.49 49.39 45.23 75.78 61.20 51.44 45.80 54.70 43.18 37.01 39.68 
(No of Observations) 726 482 634 417 92 65 
Nanny/Sitter 97.51 78.46 79.17 60.49 90.68 75.10 79.28 61.58 125.82 89.67 76.91 39.61 
(No of Observations) 67 72 57 69 10 3 
Relative care 53.39 50.38 48.30 37.74 57.20 56.69 49.40 38.14 37.22 27.26 38.41 33.08 
(No of Observations) 314 201 264 181 50 20 
Total Weekly Expediture (1997 $) 68.61 57.46 53.18 47.53 70.83 58.19 55.27 48.52 54.98 50.84 37.89 36.19 
(No of Observations) 1333 895 1161 793 172 102 
Note: all dollar figures have been adjusted for inflation and are in 1997 dollars. 
Nanny/sitter care is the least used/preferred arrangement for single mothers whether 
working or not. This pattern is also consistent with common findings as this mode is 
relatively more expensive. 
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Looking at the proportion of parents making payments (out of those who used a given 
childcare mode), it is seen that working single mothers, overall, are more likely to make a 
payment compared to the unemployed single mothers. As mentioned above, neither 
group of mothers is very likely to pay for relative care. However, this may ignore 
presence of other indirect forms of (cash or non-cash) payments for such informal care 
services. For example, there might possibly be trading among parents and caregivers and 
sometimes parents may pay for particular family needs of the caregivers (e.g., food or 
clothing) rather than cash payments for their services. This would imply that our child 
care expenditure is under-estimated and would be higher if we were able to measure and 
include such indirect payments to the relative care providers. 
Regarding care for a child under six, 87% of the working mothers are likely to pay for 
family care, whereas only 59% of the unemployed mothers are likely to pay for family 
care. Similarly, a high proportion of the working single mothers pay for formal day care 
(79%) relative to unemployed single mothers (46%). As mentioned earlier, only 27% of 
working single mothers pay for relative care, the mode least likely to make a payment 
for. The unemployed single mothers are half as likely (14%) to pay for relative care. 
We observe similar differences between the two (working vs. not-working) groups of 
single mothers in terms of likelihood of paying for children six and over. 76% (out of 
those who use the mode) of the working single mothers are likely to pay for family care 
compared to only 50% of those single mothers who are not working. Regarding formal 
care, the proportions are 69% vs. 53%, respectively. Again, we find that working single 
mothers are twice as likely to pay for relative care (14.49% vs. 7.32%) then the 
unemployed single mothers for children six and over. 
In summary, working single mothers are more likely to pay for family care, followed by 
formal care, nanny care, and finally relative care respectively for both younger and older 
children. Similar pattern is observed for unemployed single mothers regarding children 
less than six years of age. However, the order (in terms of likelihood of payment) 
changes to formal care, family care, nanny care and lastly relative care for older children 
for this group of mothers. 
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When we compare the average weekly expenditures in real terms, we find that the 
working single mothers’ payment is consistently higher than those who are not working, 
for all modes of childcare arrangement. Nanny/sitter care is found to be the most 
expensive one with average weekly expenses of $90.68 for a child under six, and $79.28 
for a child six or over. It seems that single mothers without work incur higher costs on 
average for nanny services for young children ($125.82 vs. $90.68).  
However, we only have 10 unemployed single mothers with children under six years of 
age and 3 unemployed single mothers with children six or older in this category 
(nanny/sitter care), which is a sample size too small to draw any meaningful statistical 
comparison. Apart from nanny/sitter care, formal day care for children under six is the 
most expensive mode ($75.78) for working single mothers, while family care is the most 
expensive for the older children for this group of mothers $59.26). We observe opposite 
patterns for the unemployed single mothers, as they spend most for family care for the 
younger children ($56.89) and formal care for the older children ($37.01). However, the 
differences in the payments are small. 
For a single mother, the average weekly expenditure is $68.61 for all children under six 
and, $53.18 for all children six or older. The working single mothers make higher 
payments on average per week than the non-working single mothers for children of both 
age groups. In order to depict the relative magnitude, expenses for a child under six is 
33.68% of a typical single mother’s weekly wage income (calculated based on real wage 
[$9.56/hour] and hours worked per week [22 hours] from section 2.1). This is by no 
means small considering that these women are likely to be the sole earners in their 
family. However, the EITC expansion is likely to reduce the magnitude of this 
proportion. As discussed earlier, the EITC is a supplement to wage income, especially in 
the phase-in range. When we consider the after-EITC wage of the single mothers, the 
relative magnitude of child care costs as a proportion of wag income is likely to go down. 
This is likely to be the case as long as the cost or price of child care does not increase 
faster than the increase in the phase-in credit rate of the EITC. 
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2.3 Summary Statistics of EITC-related Variables 
In the tax modules of the SIPP, respondents are asked questions regarding whether they 
filed federal tax returns, whether they claimed EITC benefits and if so, the amount 
claimed and other matters. Summaries of the tax-related variables from the sample of the 
study are presented in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4 Tax Filing and EITC Claims (All Panels) 
Variables 
All Women Single Mothers 
Never Married Women 
(no kids) 
Mean Mean Mean 
Tax filed (%) 48.16 53.28 58.96 
(Observations) 109935 16626 17364 
Of those who filed: 
   
Has tax copy (%) 25.49 21.31 24.07 
Filed as Single (%) 35.42 34.85 93.22 
Filed as Married (joint) (%) 45.89 04.15 00.72 
Filed as Married (Sep) (%) 03.41 02.73 00.04 
Filed as Unmarried Head (%) 12.83 55.09 04.06 
Filed for EITC (%) 12.16 36.18 04.24 
(Observations) 53550 8945 10067 
EITC amount claimed (1997 $) 1534.94 1613.56 1060.14 
(standard deviation) 1084.99 1099.19 1084.15 
Observations for EITC claim 3502 1721 224 
 
It is observed that 48.16% of the full sample (consisting of married and single women), 
53.28% of the single mothers and 58.96% of never-married no-children women said that 
they filed the federal tax return. However, less than one-quarter of these women have tax 
copies. The majority of the single mothers file taxes as unmarried head of household 
followed by single filing status. 93.22% of the never-married women file taxes as single. 
Out of those who filed a federal tax return, 36.18% of the single mothers claimed EITC 
and the average claimed amount is $1,613.56 (in constant 1997 dollars). About 4.24% of 
the never-married women claimed EITC when they filed federal tax returns, with an 
average amount of $1,060.14 (in constant 1997 dollars). 
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Often times these variables are considered of limited value because a large proportion of 
the households tend not to respond these questions. Non-response is a major issue for 
these questions (Karl Scholz, 1993). Sometimes many households are not even asked 
these questions if the interviews take too long or if there is a danger of non-cooperation 
on the part of the respondents. Scholz also points out that households relying on paid tax 
preparers (a significant proportion of the EITC claimants) might not be aware of or 
remember whether they received the EITC. As a result, he argues that the population of 
households, who reported to have referred to the tax copy while answering the tax 
module questions, would be a more reliable sample to estimate participation and amount 
of EITC claimed. 
 
2.4 Summary Statistics across the Panels 
In order to capture snapshots of the key variables over time, I summarized some of the 
variables across the four panels. The summary statistics are presented in Table 2.5. 
It is evident that both of these groups of women experienced substantial fluctuations in 
their ‘other’ income over the duration of the sample. Single mothers experiences 
decreases in their property income during fall of 1993 and 1994. After remaining stable 
during the summer 1997-summer 1999 periods, it rose slightly in 2001. The proportion of 
single mothers with a job has been gradually on the rise over the sample period (except 
for Panel 1993, wave 3). However, their hourly wage (in constant 1997 dollars) has 
remained remarkably stagnant with very small increments, especially during fall 1993- 
summer 1999. Their hours worked increased during fall 1993-1994, but continued to fall 
since then.  Though there is also fluctuations in childcare expenses (in constant 1997 
dollars), it seems single mothers incurred lower amounts of these expenses in 2001 than 
they did in fall of 1993. This may reflect lower demand for childcare as they work fewer 
hours.  These are expenses incurred by single mothers and do not reflect the market price 
of providing for childcare services. The proportion of single mothers paying for care 
dipped in the fall-1994, but has been hovering around 14% since then. It seems that the 
 
 
Page 51  
proportion of single mothers who filed federal tax return hovers around 54-57%, except 
for the year 2001, when it is 46%.  
Table 2.5 Panel-wise Summary Statistics of Single Mothers and Single Women 
without children 
 Single Mothers 
Variables 1992 1993 1993 1996 1996 2001 
  
(wave 6 & 
tm 8) 
(wave 3 & 
tm 5) 
(wave 6 & 
tm 8) (wave 4) (wave 10) 
(wave 
4) 
Monthly non-labor income 
(1997 $) 265.21 283.38 269.35 244.88 283.97 276.31 
(standard deviation) 577.35 603.18 587.56 491.11 574.00 530.74 
Monthly property income 
(1997 $) 41.63 33.31 28.65 37.93 40.01 37.57 
(standard deviation) 223.71 173.17 153.76 210.29 220.70 386.03 
Proportion working (%) 59.36 57.17 58.45 67.56 70.82 67.96 
Hourly wage (1997 $) 9.20 9.24 9.31 9.31 10.13 9.94 
(standard deviation) 5.87 5.36 6.23 7.57 14.83 8.07 
Weekly work hours 20.53 19.62 20.22 23.14 24.42 23.31 
(standard deviation) 18.92 18.85 19.03 18.64 18.19 18.53 
Proportion paying for 
childcare (%) 10.62 10.44 09.92 14.06 13.56 13.68 
Weekly expenditure on 
childcare (1997 $) 71.37 69.48 71.18 63.25 64.68 66.70 
(standard deviation) 50.16 46.89 68.19 50.67 59.67 63.67 
Observations (Chilcare) 203 213 192 575 435 451 
Proportion filed for tax (%) 55.05 52.27 53.56 56.27 57.00 45.88 
Proportion claimed EITC 
(%) 18.00 17.66 19.65 17.52 21.98 20.91 
EITC amount claimed 
(1997 $) 1094.24 1021.20 1834.70 1737.54 1761.99 
2094.2
8 
(standard deviation) 594.64 577.42 1066.14 1035.67 1025.15 
1489.6
4 
Observations (EITC) 202 212 231 323 400 353 
Reference time period:             
Childcare 
Fall of 
1993 
Fall of 
1993 
Fall of 
1994 
Summer 
of 1997 
Summer 
of 1999 
Spring 
2002 
Tax year 1993 1993 1994 1996 1998 2001 
No. of Observations 1942 2052 1941 4070 3315 3306 
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Table 2.5 Panel-wise Summary Statistics of Single Mothers and Single Women 
without children (Continued) 
 Never married women (without children) 
Variables 1992 1993 1993 1996 1996 2001 
  
(wave 6 & 
tm 8) 
(wave 3 & 
tm 5) 
(wave 6 & 
tm 8) 
(wave 
4) 
(wave 
10) 
(wave 
4) 
Monthly nonlabor income 
(1997 $) 309.08 323.89 333.81 276.72 276.66 252.98 
(standard deviation) 845.67 1058.83 1035.13 885.01 720.87 745.15 
Monthly proporty income 
(1997 $) 95.10 103.93 92.08 68.15 76.98 48.61 
(standard deviation) 505.42 469.47 393.81 261.10 321.75 301.57 
Proportion working (%) 72.45 74.25 74.16 75.67 74.23 73.48 
Hourly wage (1997 $) 10.24 10.55 10.33 10.39 11.00 11.85 
(standard deviation) 7.35 7.36 6.59 11.94 9.65 11.05 
Weekly work hours 25.76 27.17 26.92 26.77 26.12 25.97 
(standard deviation) 18.56 18.60 18.64 18.32 18.58 18.69 
Proportion filed for tax (%) 62.48 66.55 63.70 63.03 58.56 43.15 
Proportion claimed EITC 
(%) 02.59 01.72 01.94 02.92 02.55 03.09 
EITC amount claimed 
(1997 $) 826.71 1030.10 793.17 758.26 1229.57 
1518.4
5 
(standard deviation) 553.32 651.93 936.35 738.00 1070.69 
1613.3
0 
Observations (EITC) 32 17 22 51 48 54 
Tax year 1993 1993 1994 1996 1998 2001 
No. of Observations 2209 2073 2029 4074 3434 3545 
 
One possible reason for the lower percentage in 2001 may be due to the timing of the 
survey. This wave was conducted in spring 2001 and hence may have been too early for a 
lot of the respondents to file tax returns. The proportion of EITC claims have been 
gradually on the rise, so has been the claimed amount which increased from $1094 in 
fall-1993 to $2094 (1997 dollars). This is consistent with the expansions of the EITC 
benefits since mid-1990s. 
Never-married women with no children also experienced substantial drops in their ‘other’ 
income and property income during the sample period. Their wage rate remained 
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stagnant during most part of the sample period, but it increased in 1999 and 2001. They 
seem to working similar hours in 2001 as in 1993, though there were periodic rises in 
hours worked between these years. Proportion of these women who are working is 
slightly higher in 2001 than their 1993 shares. 
Increasing proportion of these women are filing tax returns, though it dropped a little in 
1999. As stated above, the figures for 2001 may have been affected by premature timing 
of the survey for tax returns. Though the proportion of EITC claims shows a rising trend 
over the panels, only a small proportion of these women claim EITC. There is significant 
increases in the amount of EITC claimed, especially during 1999 and 2001. One might 
argue that the control group of women is ‘contaminated’ in the sense that they are also 
eligible for the EITC benefits since 1994. However, as seen from Table 2.5, the 
proportion of never married women (with no children) claiming EITC is very small. 
Furthermore, these are ‘claimed’, not ‘actual’ statistics and recall that there are serious 
concerns regarding the credibility of these ‘claimed’ amounts (Karl Scholz, 1993). 
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3 SELECTION-CORRECTED WAGE AND CHILDCARE 
EXPENDITURE 
 
I approached the empirical estimation process in several steps, as discussed in detail in 
Section 1.3.  The first step of the process is to estimate a bivariate model of probability of 
participation and probability of using paid care. The inverse-mills-ratio constructed from 
this first-stage model is then used to estimate selection-corrected wage and costs of care. 
The need for estimating a joint reduced form participation and usage of paid care arises 
because of the presence of endogeneity, simultaneity, and potential selection issues in 
directly estimating wages and costs of care. The predicted wage and cost of care enter the 
final-stage model of participation as regressors. Estimates of the first-stage bivariate 
model and second-stage selection-corrected wage and costs of care and presented and 
discussed below.  
 
3.1 Results from Reduced-form Models of Labor- force Participation and Use of 
Paid Childcare 
I estimate the following reduced-form bivariate probit equation using the full sample of 
married women (with spouses present) as well as all single women (with or without 
children). The results are produced in Table 3.1. The dependent variables are probability 
of employment and probability of using paid care services.  The regressors include a set 
of demographic characteristics of the women, a set of household composition variables, 
and a set of structural variables. The demographic variables are age, non-labor income, 
and a set of dichotomous variables for education levels, race, citizenship status and 
disability. The household composition variables include presence of other adults, number 
of own children, number of infants, number if children under 5, number of children 
between 6-12, number of children between 13-17, marital status etc. Variables such as 
state EITC (a dichotomous variable), state’s AFDC/TANF benefit levels for 2 and 3 
persons’ family, the estimated employer costs of workers compensation insurance 
payments by the state, state’s unemployment rate, etc. are the structural variables. 
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Table 3.1 Bi-variate Probit Estimation of Probability of Participation and 
Probability of Using Paid Child care 
  Employment Pay for Care 
  Coef. Robust Std. Error z Coef. Robust Std. Error z 
Age 0.0803 0.0028 28.17 0.1322 0.0064 20.73 
Age squared -0.0011 0.0000 -31.09 -0.0021 0.0001 -23.88 
Disabled -1.0080 0.0146 -69.13 - - - 
High School 0.3972 0.0134 29.63 0.2826 0.0267 10.59 
Some college 0.5052 0.0137 36.88 0.4372 0.0265 16.48 
College 0.6560 0.0159 41.37 0.5555 0.0281 19.77 
Post college 0.7538 0.0255 29.57 0.7684 0.0367 20.92 
Naturalized -0.0497 0.0235 -2.12 0.0437 0.0369 1.19 
Not naturalized -0.3068 0.0191 -16.08 -0.0824 0.0308 -2.68 
Married (sp ab.) 0.0131 0.0398 0.33 -0.2518 0.0648 -3.88 
Widowed 0.0865 0.0267 3.24 -0.2152 0.0670 -3.21 
Divorced 0.2891 0.0145 19.95 -0.0985 0.0230 -4.29 
Separated 0.1820 0.0236 7.70 -0.1093 0.0356 -3.07 
Never married 0.0818 0.0133 6.16 -0.5121 0.0222 -23.08 
Black -0.0005 0.0134 -0.03 0.1122 0.0211 5.31 
Hispanic -0.0021 0.0156 -0.13 0.1125 0.0241 4.66 
Other race -0.1131 0.0220 -5.15 -0.0381 0.0357 -1.07 
Other adults -0.0346 0.0048 -7.28 -0.1670 0.0113 -14.72 
No. of own kids -0.1095 0.0045 -24.09 0.0419 0.0210 1.99 
No. of infants -0.1103 0.0229 -4.83 -0.2807 0.0284 -9.89 
No of kids below 5 -0.2520 0.0089 -28.39 0.5510 0.0216 25.48 
No. of kids 6-12 - - - 0.1756 0.0220 8.00 
No. of kids 13-17 - - - -0.1025 0.0244 -4.19 
No-labor income -0.0002 0.0000 -11.81 0.0001 0.00001 -0.97 
Property income -0.0002 0.0000 -13.30 0.00002 0.00003 0.96 
Workers compensation 0.0000 0.0000 -7.57 0.00001 0.0000 -0.16 
State unemploy. rate -0.0472 0.0032 -14.84 -0.0603 0.0046 -13.01 
AFDC (2person) 0.0012 0.0003 4.06 -0.0006 0.0004 -1.45 
AFDC (3person) -0.0006 0.0002 -2.53 0.0005 0.0004 1.55 
State EITC -0.0085 0.0162 -0.52 - - - 
Constant -0.7074 0.0598 -11.83 -3.2931 0.1220 -26.9900 
Observations  109190 
Rho       0.3828 0.0083 
Wald test of rho=0: chi2(1) =1713.91   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000   
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Results from the employment equation are consistent with prior expectations. First, we 
find that age is positively related with labor force participation, but the relationship 
becomes negative at some point indicating older people (beyond 36.5 years) are less 
likely to be employed as they approach the retirement age. Disability also negatively 
affects employment as expected. The effect of education on employment is positive. 
Education signals ability of the individual and also increases the stock of human 
resources of the individual, thus enhancing chances of employment. The findings suggest 
that native citizens are more likely to be employed. This might be due to strict 
immigration regulations, which is part of the reason why whites are more likely to be 
employed. Single women (with or without children) are more likely to be working 
relative to married women (with spouses present) as these women are most often the sole 
earners in their families. Presence of other adults in the house might imply alternative 
sources of income and hence negatively affects employment. Presence of children 
(especially young children) also negatively affects labor force participation as they need 
to be cared for. Due to negative income effect, non-labor income is inversely related with 
participation, an expected prediction from the labor supply model. State policies relating 
to workers’ compensation and AFDC benefit level for 3-person family also reduce 
participation likelihood. 
Findings from the use of non-parental childcare equation show that though age is 
positively related with use of non-parental childcare, it becomes negative beyond 31.5 
years of age. This is expected because as children get older, the need for child care 
obviously falls. Higher educated women are more likely to demand child care services. 
Native citizens are also more likely than non-naturalized citizens to seek paid non-
parental child care services. While married women (with spouses present) are more likely 
to use paid non-parental child care services, white women are less likely to use do so. 
Presence of other adult family members reduces the probability of using paid care. 
Presence of young children increases the likelihood of using paid care. However, 
presence of teenage children reduces the likelihood of using paid care. Non-labor and 
property income do not affect likelihood of using paid care. Lastly, higher state 
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unemployment rate and AFDC/TANF benefit reduce the likelihood of using paid 
childcare. 
The jointly estimated bivariate probit model accounts for the correlation between 
employment participation and usage of paid childcare services. The justification for using 
a bivariate model is that the two decisions of employment and usage of paid care are 
interrelated. A standard bivariate model is where: 
(16)                            
            
            
    
                    
 (  )                                
            
            
    
                
The error terms consist of a common term and a second term that is unique to each model 
and hence the two equations are related through correlated error terms. As expected, the 
estimated correlation coefficient is positive and significant (rho=0.3828). This means that 
unobserved factors that increase the probability of employment also increase the 
probability of using paid non-parental care. We can test the hypothesis that the bivariate 
probit model fits the data better than separate models, using a simple Wald test. The Wald 
test statistic for the hypothesis that the two decisions are independent (i.e. uncorrelated 
error terms or rho=0) is 1713.91 and is significant. This means that the probability of 
employment will be dependent on the value/probability of using paid care. 
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3.2 Selection-corrected Wage and Childcare Expenditure  
Estimation of reduced form bivariate model was the first-stage of the three-step 
estimation process. Presence of potential selection issues require us to estimate selection 
–corrected wage and costs of paid care so that these could be used as regressors in the 
final-stage estimation of participation. Therefore, inverse mills’ ratio was constructed 
from the first-stage estimates to estimate selection-corrected equations of wage and cost 
of child care. The resulting coefficients from these two estimated equations were used to 
construct predicted unconditional hourly wage and predicted unconditional weekly price 
or cost of childcare. Again, these results were generated utilizing the full sample of 
married women (with spouses) as well as single women (with or without children) to 
obtain robust estimates. 
I omitted the following variables in the wage equation: non-labor income, number of 
children, young children of various age groups, presence of other adults in the house and, 
state variables regarding AFDC benefits, workers’ compensation, unemployment rate and 
presence of state EITC. The variables that are included in the first-stage bivariate probit 
model, but do not appear in the second-stage model of cost of childcare equation are: age 
squared, number of own children, other adults in the family, presence of teenage children, 
non-labor income, state variables regarding AFDC benefits, workers’ compensation and, 
unemployment rate. 
The results are produced in Table 3.2 and 3.3. The coefficients of the wage equation have 
expected signs. It is found that age positively affects wage; however beyond a certain 
level, wage falls with age. Higher educated women have higher wages. Additionally, 
married women (with spouse present) have higher wage than single women (with or 
without children). It might reflect the phenomenon that married women require a higher 
wage than single women due to the presence of another earning member in the family. 
Women living in the metro areas also have higher wage, which to a large extent is 
reflecting the higher cost of living in the metro areas. The results also show that non-
white as well as disabled women have lower wage. Other studies (e.g. Connelly and 
Kimmel, 2003) report similar findings.  
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Table 3.2 Selection-corrected Wage Equation 
Wage Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Age 0.4113 0.0211 19.49 0.0000 
Age-squared -0.0043 0.0003 -16.00 0.0000 
High school 1.1302 0.1218 9.28 0.0000 
Some college 2.3072 0.1279 18.04 0.0000 
College 5.2430 0.1425 36.79 0.0000 
Post-college 8.0119 0.1854 43.22 0.0000 
Naturalized 0.7147 0.1635 4.37 0.0000 
Not naturalized -1.1620 0.1536 -7.57 0.0000 
Married (spouse absent) -0.5940 0.2909 -2.04 0.0410 
Widowed -0.6514 0.1989 -3.27 0.0010 
Divorced 0.0344 0.0945 0.36 0.7160 
Separated -0.5324 0.1616 -3.29 0.0010 
Never married -0.1471 0.0878 -1.67 0.0940 
Black -0.3478 0.0906 -3.84 0.0000 
Hispanic -0.6351 0.1118 -5.68 0.0000 
Other race -0.0080 0.1565 -0.05 0.9590 
Metro 1.2879 0.0702 18.34 0.0000 
Disabled -1.8812 0.1926 -9.77 0.0000 
Inverse Mills Ratio 1.3770 0.2243 6.14 0.0000 
Constant -5.4981 0.4957 -11.09 0.0000 
          
Adjusted R-Squared 0.1002       
Observations 71524       
 
Regarding weekly cost of childcare (shown in Table 3.3), I find that age has positive 
impact on cost of childcare. Higher educated women pay a higher price for childcare. 
Non-naturalized citizens pay a lower price than natives while naturalized citizens incur 
higher costs. Married women pay a higher price than single women. White women tend 
to pay more than others. Presence of young children raises the cost of childcare, while 
presence of teenage children lowers the cost. Finally, women living in the metro areas 
experience higher costs for childcare. It is important to note that I haven’t controlled for 
quality of child care or income and hence some of these estimates may be affected by 
these omissions.  
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Table 3.3 Selection-corrected Weekly Price of Childcare (constant 1982-84 dollars) 
Weekly Cost of Childcare Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Age -0.0226 0.0166 -1.3600 0.1730 
High school 1.5075 0.3477 4.3400 0.0000 
Some college 3.2938 0.3645 9.0400 0.0000 
College 8.0453 0.4297 18.7200 0.0000 
Post-college 12.8104 0.6601 19.4100 0.0000 
Naturalized 0.5708 0.5612 1.0200 0.3090 
Not naturalized -1.6628 0.4326 -3.8400 0.0000 
Married (spouse absent) -1.5875 1.0144 -1.5600 0.1180 
Widowed 0.5196 0.9175 0.5700 0.5710 
Divorced 0.2429 0.3501 0.6900 0.4880 
Separated -0.3870 0.5411 -0.7200 0.4740 
Never married -0.5016 0.4308 -1.1600 0.2440 
Black -0.7267 0.3408 -2.1300 0.0330 
Hispanic -0.1796 0.3618 -0.5000 0.6200 
Other race -0.2962 0.5273 -0.5600 0.5740 
Number of infants -5.1825 0.4188 -12.3700 0.0000 
Number of kids below 5 6.3820 0.2246 28.4200 0.0000 
No. of kids between 13-17 -2.0187 0.1667 -12.1100 0.0000 
Metro 1.7540 0.2505 7.0000 0.0000 
Inverse Mills Ratio -2.9218 0.3451 -8.4700 0.0000 
Constant 7.3850 0.8927 8.2700 0.0000 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.1011       
Observations 52,308       
 
The estimates of the standard errors from the bivariate model are incorrect. As a result, I 
estimated Heckman selection-corrected equations for wage and costs of paid care, which 
was utilized to predict wages and costs of care to be included in the final-stage model of 
participation. 
 
3.3 Results from Multinomial Logit Model of Modes of Childcare 
The main focus of my study is to estimate effects of EITC expansions and child care 
costs on participation. However, access to child care services is also key aspect in 
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decision to work. As a result, I investigate the demand for child care services for working 
mothers by applying a multinomial logit model and a sample selection model to augment 
and enrich my analysis. My interest is in the analysis of factors, including the role of 
child care expenditure, that influence the choice of child care services. 
I consider five categories of choice for child care – family care, formal day care, nanny 
care, relative care (including self-care), and parental care. The relative care has been 
designated as the reference category since it is the most frequently used mode. This 
requires estimating 4 (5-1) equations, one for each category relative to the reference 
category to predict the probabilities of choosing the various modes of child care given the 
independent variables. 
Based on utility theory, we can argue that parents evaluate the different types of child 
care services to choose the one that maximizes their utility, given the constraints of prices 
and income. Suppose, a parent makes decision on which one of the modes of child care to 
use from a set of M={0,1,….m}. Let     denote the vector of prices for each of the 
alternatives,    to represent individual parental income, and    to be a vector of socio-
economic characteristics that affect choice of modes of child care. Given this set up, each 
individual parent i chooses child care service    that maximizes the conditional indirect 
utility function: 
 (  )     (         )       
where V(.) is the deterministic part of the utility function and     is an independently and 
identically distributed error term representing unobserved heterogeneity among 
individuals and various modes of care. The probability that a parent i chooses   out of 
the set of alternatives can be written as: 
 (  )        (         )   
    (    )
∑     (   
 
   )
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Substituting the expression for the indirect utility function into the above equation and by 
normalization, we get: 
 (  )       
   (          )
   ∑     (         
 
   )
  where m=0 is the base/reference category. 
The coefficients of a multinomial logit model are of limited value for analysis. As a 
result, marginal effects need to be computed from the estimated coefficients. These 
effects measure the impact of a unit change in the continuous explanatory variable (or 
from 0 to 1 for dichotomous variables) on the probability of observing a specific mode of 
care, evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variable. 
I estimate separate multinomial logit models for modes of choice for young children 
(below six) and older children (six and above) utilizing the sample of working mothers 
(married or otherwise). The estimation process involves a number of steps. First, I use the 
first-stage bivariate model (presented earlier) to construct inverse-mills-ratio, which is 
later used in the second-stage to estimate selection-corrected price equations. Next, I 
predict prices for each individual mode of care for those women who have children. 
These predicted prices, together with socio-economic characteristics, are used in the 
final-stage multinomial logit model. As stated, these steps have been applied first to 
estimate choice of mode for young children, and later for older children. The marginal 
effects from the multinomial logit model are presented in Table 3.4 for the formal day 
care services. 
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Table 3.4 Marginal Effects from Multinomal Logit Model for Formal Day Care 
  Children Under 6 Children 6 and over 
  Pr(formal care)= 0.3027 Pr(formal care)= 0.1740 
variable        dy/dx Std. Err. P>z dy/dx Std. Err. P>z 
Age 0.0013 0.0036 0.7080 0.0046 0.0063 0.4590 
High school 0.0190 0.0298 0.5240 -0.0076 0.1274 0.9520 
Some college 0.0633 0.0300 0.0350 0.0148 0.1378 0.9140 
College 0.0963 0.0423 0.0230 -0.0358 0.1799 0.8420 
Post-college -0.0925 0.0781 0.2360 -0.0710 0.1011 0.4820 
Naturalized -0.1574 0.0285 0.0000 -0.0349 0.0689 0.6120 
Not naturalized -0.1585 0.0214 0.0000 -0.1274 0.0572 0.0260 
Married (sps ab.) -0.0228 0.0555 0.6810 -0.0244 0.0554 0.6600 
Widowed -0.1687 0.1355 0.2130 -0.0834 0.0654 0.2030 
Divorced 0.0028 0.0440 0.9480 -0.0810 0.0719 0.2600 
Separated 0.0022 0.0748 0.9770 -0.0518 0.0173 0.0030 
Never married 0.0649 0.0415 0.1180 0.0165 0.0589 0.7790 
Black 0.0583 0.0667 0.3830 -0.0295 0.0141 0.0370 
Hispanic -0.1001 0.0280 0.0000 -0.0156 0.0809 0.8470 
Other race 0.0073 0.0503 0.8840 -0.0598 0.0332 0.0720 
fam_ads    -0.0234 0.0214 0.2750 -0.0213 0.0079 0.0070 
No. of infants -0.1169 0.0205 0.0000 -0.0073 0.0164 0.6560 
No. of kids 0-5 0.0261 0.0183 0.1530 -0.0270 0.1345 0.8410 
No. of kids 6-12    -0.0387 0.0069 0.0000 -0.0235 0.0056 0.0000 
No. of kids 13-17 0.0522 0.0266 0.0500 -0.0557 0.0867 0.5200 
Real other income    0.0001 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.0950 
Real property income     0.0001 0.0000 0.1280 0.0000 0.0000 0.4820 
Predicted price of family care     -0.0266 0.0045 0.0000 -0.0005 0.0030 0.8620 
Predicted price of formal care 0.0126 0.0058 0.0310 0.0044 0.0096 0.6500 
Predicted price of nanny care -0.0005 0.0011 0.6400 0.0018 0.0040 0.6610 
Predicted price of relative care 0.0164 0.0127 0.1960 -0.0033 0.0062 0.5960 
Poverty rate  0.0055 0.0017 0.0010 -0.0007 0.0011 0.5530 
 
These marginal effects presented in Table 12 measure the impact of a unit change in the 
continuous explanatory variables (from 0 to 1 for dichotomous variables) on the 
probability of choosing formal day care compared to relative care, evaluated at the mean 
of the explanatory variables. We find that only a handful of the variables are statistically 
significant. Regarding modes of choice for young children, women with some college or 
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college degree are more likely to use formal care compared with relative care. Both 
naturalized and non-naturalized mothers are less likely to rely on formal day care than 
native citizens. Similarly, being of Hispanic race as well as having young children 
reduces the likelihood of using formal care. Higher non-labor income increases the 
chances of relying more on formal day care. However, the estimated effects of the 
(predicted) price variables for the various modes of choice are problematic. Though some 
of these are significant, but many of them have incorrect signs. I tried several alternative 
methods to obtain better estimates. Unfortunately, those results were also similar. While 
these results are problematic, nevertheless such findings are not uncommon in the 
literature. Connelly and Kimmel (2003) report similar findings using SIPP 1992 and 1993 
panels. One probable reason for such inaccurate estimates might be due to poor 
price/costs of care information. A large number of mothers in the sample rely on relative 
care, for which they seldom make payments. This leads to limited information as well as 
variation in the price data. The problem of data quality is accentuated by lack of 
information on non-cash forms of payment. Furthermore, there are important differences 
in choice sets regarding availability of various modes of child care services. For example, 
child care options are different in metro areas compared to non-metro areas (Walker et al. 
2011). In the absence of information regarding what choices people face, estimates are 
likely to be poor. 
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4 FINAL-STAGE ESTIMATION OF LABOR-FORCE 
PARTICIPATION 
 
The primary objective of my dissertation is to estimate probability of labor force 
participation as a function of EITC expansions, wages, child care costs and demographic 
variables. As discussed earlier in detail, multiple equations are needed in several steps to 
estimate this ultimate model. As part of the three-step approach, I estimated a bivariate 
model of participation and usage of paid care services in the first stage. The second stage 
involved estimating selection-corrected wage and costs of care equations based on the 
inverse-mills-ratios from the first-stage bivariate model. Having corrected for the 
endogeneity and selection issues, the final stage strategy is to estimate a probit model of 
participation using the selection-corrected wage and costs of care as regressors together 
with a set of socio-economic characteristics of the single mothers and single women (no 
children).  
 
4.1 Results from the Final-stage Probit Model of Labor-force Participation 
The dependent variable in the final stage probit equation is labor force participation. The 
treatment group of women is single mothers who were the primary target group of the 
EITC expansions of the 1990s. The control group is the never married women with no 
children. The before/after period of the EITC expansions is captured by a dummy 
variable ‘post96’. 
The following Table (Table 4.1) provides marginal effects from the final-stage probit 
regression. Though my primary interest are the difference-in-difference estimators 
‘treat*post96’ and ‘treat*cost*post96’, the presence of several interaction terms require 
us to consider the partial derivative of the dependent variable (labor force participation) 
with respect to the treatment group, evaluated at the average predicted childcare 
expenses, to find out how single mothers change their labor force participation relative to 
never married women (without children) after the EITC expansions of the 1990s that 
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were implemented till 1996. The results show that labor force participation of the 
treatment group was higher in post 1996 (coefficient on ‘treat*post96’ is positive), but it 
is not statistically significant. This outcome is not surprising since there was a trend of 
overall decline in women’s labor force participation since 2000 (Monthly Labor Review, 
October 2006).  
Table 4.1 Final Estimates of Participation 
Probit regression, reporting marginal effects 
Number of obs 33997 
LR chi2(28) 5862.00 
Prob > chi2 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.1403 
Log likelihood   -17953.723 
 
hasjob1 dF/dx Std. Err. z P>z 
          
disabled*  -0.33294 0.0118 -28.6400 0.0000 
naturalized -0.02484 0.0178 -1.4200 0.1560 
not-naturalized*   -0.02708 0.0121 -2.2900 0.0220 
married/spouse absent  -0.03272 0.0213 -1.5700 0.1160 
widowed*  -0.07067 0.0228 -3.2400 0.0010 
divorced* 0.04218 0.0092 4.4400 0.0000 
separated* 0.04373 0.0114 3.6900 0.0000 
black* -0.08538 0.0091 -9.7200 0.0000 
hispanic * -0.04055 0.0092 -4.5000 0.0000 
otherace*   -0.10828 0.0148 -7.7200 0.0000 
metro -0.01729 0.0094 -1.8300 0.0670 
rfoklt18 *  -0.02546 0.0041 -6.2000 0.0000 
No of Infants* -0.08935 0.0153 -5.8300 0.0000 
No if kids (0-5) -0.02843 0.0225 -1.2600 0.2070 
real other income*  -0.00005 0.0000 -9.1100 0.0000 
real property income*     -0.00009 0.0000 -6.8000 0.0000 
unemployment rate *   -0.02025 0.0025 -8.2300 0.0000 
AFDC benefit (2 person family) *   0.00048 0.0002 2.8000 0.0050 
AFDC benefit (3 person family)*    -0.00038 0.0001 -2.6500 0.0080 
State EITC *    -0.09197 0.0318 -2.8900 0.0040 
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Table 4.1 Final Estimates of Participation (Continued) 
hasjob1 dF/dx Std. Err. z P>z 
realwage *  0.04813 0.0031 15.7300 0.0000 
real total cost (wk)*  -0.00260 0.0013 -2.0400 0.0410 
treatment*  -0.05170 0.0244 -2.1200 0.0340 
post96  -0.03298 0.0236 -1.3900 0.1650 
treat*post96 0.01366 0.0281 0.4800 0.6290 
treat*cost    0.00001 0.0008 0.0100 0.9900 
cost*post96    -0.00009 0.0008 -0.1100 0.9140 
treat*cost*post96*   0.00236 0.0010 2.4700 0.0130 
* statistically significant at 5% or less. 
Higher cost for childcare reduces labor force participation on average since the 
coefficient on ‘real total cost (wk)’ is negative and significant. In contrast, higher wage 
increases participation on average (the coefficient on ‘real wage’ is both positive and 
significant. 
I evaluated the derivative of the dependent variable (labor force participation) with 
respect to the ‘treatment’ variable at the mean of the predicted expenditure for child care. 
This exercise indicates a 3.32% increase in the participation of single mothers in the post-
1996 era relative to never-married women without any children. This estimate is similar 
to the roughly 3% participation increase estimated by Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001), or 
4.7% increase found by Fitzpatrick and Thompson (2010) for the 1993 expansion. There 
are a number of differences with respect to these studies. First, both of these studies used 
CPS data to estimate the impact whereas I’ve used SIPP. Secondly, none of these studies 
explicitly controlled for child care expenses. Moreover, their sample selection criterion, 
the definition of treatment and control groups are different from this study. However, I 
re-estimated the model using their definition of a control group 
(widowed/separated/divorced/never married women without children) and found that 
participation of single mothers increased by an estimated amount of 4.46% in the post-
1996 era relative to single women without any children. The size of the estimated effect 
is larger when estimated using the ‘usual’ control group, but still within the range 
commonly found in the literature. 
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Taking derivative of the dependent variable (labor force participation) with respect to the 
‘cost’ of child care variable yields a negative impact on participation for single mothers 
in both pre and post 1996 period. This exercise reveals an estimated reduction in labor 
force participation of single mothers by 0.259% in the pre-1996 period and 0.028% in the 
post-1996 period relative to single women due to increase in the weekly cost of care. This 
result implies that the cost of child care had smaller impact on participation in post-1996 
than before 1996. Controls for immigration status, marital status, race and other 
coefficients have the expected signs. 
I evaluate the derivative of the dependent variable (labor force participation) with respect 
to the ‘treatment’ variable at the respective quartiles of the predicted child care cost for 
two alternative specifications. The first specification uses a reduced form bivariate probit  
model in the first stage of estimation to create selection terms to be utilized for second 
stage wage and cost of care equations. The predicted wage and cost of care from the 
second stage is then used to estimate the final probit model of participation. The 
alternative specification relies on Heckman selection corrected wage and cost of care 
equations to estimate the final participation model. 
The results of the derivative are presented below in Figure 4.1. As expected, it is seen 
that the two methods of estimated results yield similar estimates for the effectiveness of 
the EITC expansions of the 1990s.  
Figure 4.1 Heckman and Bivariate Estimates of Labor Force Participation 
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I predict participation from the final probit estimates and compared before and after 
policy changes for high school educated women. The findings are summarized in the 
following table (Table 4.2). It shows that though there were across the board increases in 
labor force participation for single mothers of this educational group, it was those women 
facing the highest childcare costs (fifth quintile) had the largest and the most dramatic 
increase in labor market participation. Also, the increase in participation increases as we 
gradually move to higher quintiles. This indicates higher responsiveness of women facing 
high child care costs in the post-EITC expansion period. 
Table 4.2 Predicted Labor Force Participation of High School Grad Single Mothers 
Distribution of Predicted Cost of Care 
  
Predicted Participation  
Pre 1996 Post 1996 Change (Post-Pre) 
Quintile 1 0.6124 0.6440 0.0316 
Quintile 2 0.6398 0.7026 0.0628 
Quintile 3 0.6611 0.7354 0.0743 
Quintile 4 0.5709 0.6607 0.0898 
Quintile 5 0.4704 0.6209 0.1505 
 
4.2 Demand for Child care Post-Increase in Labor Force Participation 
One can argue that there would be a feedback effect from the labor market to the cost of 
child care.  With limited expansions of supply of child care, the increase in labor force 
participation is likely to increase the cost of child care. In order to capture the distribution 
of cost at the MSA levels, I run a simple probit model of participation and predict 
probability of working which is collapsed at the MSA level. Later, I regress the cost of 
care on a set of demographic variables and the MSA-level predicted participation as 
control variables. The estimates from this model are produced below in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3 Cost of care and Predicted Participation 
Real total weekly Cost Coeffcient Std. Err. T-stat 
Age -0.0683 0.0157 -4.34 
High school 2.2962 0.3348 6.86 
Some college 4.4461 0.3380 13.15 
College 9.5109 0.3926 24.23 
Post-college 14.7509 0.6181 23.86 
Naturalized 0.6586 0.5623 1.17 
Not naturalized -1.8607 0.4333 -4.29 
Married (sps ab.) -2.1167 1.0131 -2.09 
Widowed -0.2857 0.9131 -0.31 
Divorced 0.2986 0.3502 0.85 
Separated -0.3744 0.5415 -0.69 
Never married -2.5572 0.3562 -7.18 
Black -0.1986 0.3354 -0.59 
Hispanic 0.1976 0.3685 0.54 
Other race -0.5240 0.5271 -0.99 
No. of infants -6.0432 0.4066 -14.86 
No. of kids 0-5 7.6653 0.1657 46.26 
No. of kids 13-17 -2.4459 0.1590 -15.39 
Metro 1.7185 0.2506 6.86 
Predicted participation 6.0655 3.4404 1.76 
Constant -1.5470 2.4212 -0.64 
R-squared       0.1002   
Number of observations   52,308   
 
As expected, the estimated coefficient on predicted participation is positive. This means 
that as employment increases, demand for child care increases and as a result, the cost of 
care also increases. The estimated coefficient is weakly significant. 
 
4.3 Hours Worked and EITC Expansions 
I estimated a simple regression model of hours worked using the full sample conditional 
on working. It is observed from Table 4.4 that married women with spouse absent, 
widowed, divorced and separated women work longer hours than married women with 
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spouse present. Only never married women tend to work fewer hours than married 
women (spouse present). I also find Black, Hispanic and women from other race work 
longer than White women. Number of children, presence of young children, non-labor 
income, and availability of state EITC make women work fewer hours. It is also seen that 
predicted child care costs has negative impact on hours worked and is significant.  
Table 4.4 Effect of EITC Expansions on Hours Worked 
Hours worked Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
disabled* -1.4724 0.2081 -7.0800 0.0000 
naturalized -0.0104 0.2318 -0.0400 0.9640 
not naturalized* 1.5808 0.2082 7.5900 0.0000 
married, spouse absent* 1.2329 0.4161 2.9600 0.0030 
widowed* 2.0232 0.3036 6.6600 0.0000 
divorced* 2.5067 0.1214 20.6400 0.0000 
separated* 1.8882 0.2246 8.4100 0.0000 
never married* -1.2755 0.1123 -11.3600 0.0000 
black* 1.0804 0.1456 7.4200 0.0000 
hispanic* 1.9375 0.1590 12.1900 0.0000 
otherace* 1.1283 0.2218 5.0900 0.0000 
metro -0.1041 0.1367 -0.7600 0.4460 
No of own kids* -1.5153 0.0561 -27.0300 0.0000 
No of infants* -1.1267 0.2567 -4.3900 0.0000 
No of kids below 5 years* 1.6850 0.3200 5.2700 0.0000 
Other Income (real)* -0.0006 0.0001 -6.9900 0.0000 
Property income (real)* -0.0022 0.0002 -13.0100 0.0000 
unemployment rate -0.0542 0.0367 -1.4800 0.1400 
AFDC benefit (2 person family) *       2.1000 0.0350 
AFDC benefit (3 person family)*    -0.0082 0.0022 -3.7700 0.0000 
State EITC *    -1.2342 0.4955 -2.4900 0.0130 
realwage (predicted)* 1.1240 0.0407 27.6000 0.0000 
total weekly cost of care (real)* -0.0990 0.0147 -6.7600 0.0000 
post96* -0.6077 0.2371 -2.5600 0.0100 
cost_post 0.0006 0.0062 0.1000 0.9220 
constant* 34.6909 0.3389 102.3600 0.0000 
No of Observations 73726       
Adjusted R-square 0.0777       
* statistically significant at 5% or less. 
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Interestingly, the coefficient of the dichotomous variable post96 (capturing the EITC 
expansions) is negative and statistically significant, implying overall reduction in hours 
worked by those women who were already in the work force after the EITC expansions. 
The literature on hours worked tend to find little or no change in hours worked after the 
expansions of the EITC benefits. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) found mixed, but 
insignificant impacts on hours worked. However, my findings are consistent with 
economic predictions that EITC expansions can reduce labor supply, particularly for 
those working in the stationary or phase-out range. It may be mentioned that nature of 
employment (full-time vs. part-time) also has impact on hours worked, which hasn’t been 
controlled for here. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation has investigated the relationship between the EITC-induced labor force 
participation of single mothers and the role of child care costs. A difference-in-difference 
approach based on child care modules of SIPP panels has been presented. This exercise 
differs from the existing research on the effects of EITC on labor supply as well as from 
the effects of child care costs on labor supply by considering the interaction between the 
effects of EITC and child care costs on employment. 
The expansions of the EITC benefits significantly increased incentives for work, 
particularly for low-income families with children. Existing research confirms that single 
mothers significantly increased participation in the post-EITC expansion era. As the 
single mothers seek employment, it has implications in terms of caring for their children. 
The purpose of this dissertation was to estimate the effects of child care costs on labor 
force participation of these women before and after the EITC expansions. 
My findings suggest that participation of single mothers increased post-expansion of the 
EITC benefits across the distribution of child care costs. However, the increase in 
participation is not homogenous for all single mothers. I find that single mothers facing 
low child care costs increased participation by an estimated 3.16% after the EITC 
expansions, while those women facing high costs increased participation by remarkable 
15.05%. This emerges as a new finding that has not been investigated earlier. As 
expected because of the inverse relationship between participation and child care costs, 
single mothers with high child care costs had low labor force participation before the 
EITC expansions. When after-tax wage of single mothers increased after the expansions 
particularly for those in the phase-in range, this resulted in increased participation. 
However, this finding is likely to be applicable for metro areas since majority of the 
sample live in metro areas. Studies find substantial differences between metro and non-
metro areas regarding responses to policy changes such as the EITC expansions 
(CARSEY Fact Sheet, 2007). There are also important differences among the non-metro 
tax files depending on state, race, education, family size etc. (Mammen et al. 2009). 
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A multinomial logit model was estimated to investigate how working mothers make 
choices regarding the mode of child care. Unfortunately, this exercise did not produce 
reliable estimate of how choice of mode is affected by child care costs. However, this 
result is not uncommon in the literature and raises concerns regarding the quality of the 
data on cost of care. 
The evidence from this dissertation suggests that the EITC expansions might have led to 
large-scale increases in the labor force participation of single mothers living in high-cost 
cities. While some previous investigations have suggested that the  EITC expansion may 
have been ineffective in increasing participation in large cities where cost-of-living (in 
terms of housing cost) is high (Fitzpatrick and Thompson, 2009), the results from this 
dissertation suggest a different phenomenon. The EITC expansion is found to be effective 
for single mothers living in large cities such as Boston, Phoenix, San Francisco, 
Washington, Seattle, San Diego etc. where child care costs are predicted to be the 
highest. 
A number of issues, however, need to be considered to rationalize these findings. First, 
the 1990s was an eventful period of time when a host of changes took place. It was the 
time when the welfare reform, tax reform, EITC expansions, Child Care subsidies etc. 
were implemented. It was also characterized by unusually high and long period of 
economic growth. It is reasonable to argue that all of these factors --- the welfare reform, 
tax reform, EITC, Child care subsidies, macro-economy --- influenced the observed 
changes in participation of single mothers. Disintegrating the effects of EITC and child 
care costs on participation is, therefore, a complex and challenging task. I attempted, 
albeit in a limited way, to account for some of these changes taking place during 1990s 
by including variables such as states’ unemployment rate, AFDC/TANF benefit levels for 
two and three-person families. Inclusion of a broader set of measures for these policy 
changes would certainly strengthen the findings of this dissertation.  
 
Notwithstanding these limitations, however it could be said that this finding is not 
unusual in the existing literature where there is evidence of substantial positive effect of 
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EITC on participation of single mothers based on a variety of techniques and data. The 
findings from this dissertation have raised a number of questions regarding possible 
interaction between EITC and child care costs and their impact on labor supply. It is the 
first of this kind of study and further work needs to be done to consolidate the findings 
from this research. Future work could assess the interaction between EITC and child care 
costs by including a broader set of measures for the policy changes of the 1990s as well 
as working with different datasets to investigate consistency of my findings. As an 
extension of this analysis to a different context, it would be interesting to compare 
experiences of other developed countries that implemented similar EITC-type tax 
policies. 
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